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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW'
I.

RIGHTS OF

PuBLIc

EMPLOYEES

In three recent cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals considered the extent to which classified civil service employees have a property interest in their jobs giving rise to corresponding due process procedural rights.
In Waite v. Civil Service Commission,2 the court fashioned

new procedural safeguards for public employees who are suspended from work for short periods of time, holding that the West
Virginia Code provisions and Civil Service Commission regulations
failed to provide adequate due process protections for such employees. Under the applicable statute and regulations, 3 procedural
I State ex rel. Knight v. Public Service Comm'n, 245 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1978),
which dealt with the validity of public utility rate increases, is discussed in the
section entitled CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 291.
2 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977).
3 W. VA. CODE § 29-6-13 (1976 Replacement Vol.) [now § 29-6-15 (Cum. Supp.
1978)] provides:
Any employee in the classified service who is dismissed or demoted after
completing his probationary period of service or who is suspended for
more than thirty days in any one year, may, within thirty days after such
dismissal, demotion or suspension, appeal to the Commission for review
thereof.
Article XI, Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations of the West Virginia Civil
Service System provides:
The Appointing Authority may, upon notice confirmed in writing or by
written notice, suspend any employee without pay for delinquency or
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rights of an employee suspended for 30 days or less in any one year
are limited to written notice of the suspension. While it upheld the
statute insofar as it limited appeals to the Civil Service Commission to cases involving suspensions totalling more than 30 days, the
court ruled that employees suspended for shorter periods were deprived of a significant property interest, and must first be given
written notice of the reasons for the suspension and an opportunity
to reply either orally or in writing. If the suspension arises in a
situation where there is a continuing danger to persons or property
or to the orderly conduct of the affairs of the agency, immediate
suspension is permissible, but it must be followed as soon as practicable by the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing.'
The standard for sufficiency of notice when disciplinary action
is based on employee misconduct was discussed in Snyder v. Civil
Service Commission,I in which the court ruled that the notice must
"set out sufficient facts about the alleged misconduct so that its
details are known with some particularity." ' The notice must be
specific enough to leave the employee with no reasonable doubt as
to the date of the misconduct and the identity of any persons or
property involved.
The property interest recognized by the court in Waite and
Synder ceases to exist, however, when the legislature decides that
the position should no longer be covered by civil service tenure. In
Baker v. Civil Service Commission,' the court upheld the right of
the legislature to remove from civil service coverage positions
which had been placed under the civil service system by executive
order of the governor, against challenges that the legislative action
violated both the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition
of bills of attainder, and denied employees their procedural due
process rights. Finding no procedural rights in the abolishment of
a civil service position, as distinguished from the discharge of an
employee from such a position, and finding no suggestion that the
individuals in the abolished positions formed an identifiable group
misconduct, for a period not to exceed thirty calendar days in any one

calendar year. The employee shall only have recourse to appeal if suspended for more than thirty days in any one year.
4 The court rejected an equal protection attack on § 29-6-13, holding that
procedures distinguishing between minor disciplinary punishments and major ones
are rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in dealing quickly and inexpensively with routine personnel matters.
5 238 S.E.2d 842 (W. Va. 1977).
'Id. at 844.
7 245 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 1978).
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against whom the legislature could have been motivated to act, the
court upheld the legislative action as within its power both to
create and to abolish public offices.
I1. ADMINISmATIvE PROCEDURE
In Weirton Ice and Coal Supply Company v. Public Service
Commission,I the court apparently retreated from its recent insistence that administrative agencies state the underlying reasons for
their decisions in some detail,' holding that the only finding which
must be articulated in a Public Service Commission order granting
a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as a common
carrier is the conclusory statement that "the public convenience
and necessity requires the service."'"
West Virginia Code § 24A-2-5(a) requires that the commission, before granting such a certificate, find that the service furnished by existing transportation is inefficient or inadequate, and
to find "from the evidence that the public convenience and necessity require the proposed service." Section 24A-2-5 does not specifically require the commission to state its findings of fact as part of
its order, and the agency is exempt from the general requirement
of such a statement included in the Administrative Procedures
Act." The court in Weirton Ice accepted the agency's ultimate
finding of public convenience and necessity as proof that the commission had found sufficient facts to support the conclusion, after
considering the factors required by the statute. Although it noted
that a transcript of the hearing held by the commission supported
the belief that the agency had thoroughly considered the adequacy
of existing services, the court emphasized that the commission has
no duty to distinctly state its findings, or the underlying facts
supporting them.
The court was forced to go to some lengths to distinguish
Mountain Trucking v. Public Service Commission,'" which held
that an order granting a permit to operate as a contract carrier
must contain specific findings of fact, rather than conclusory statements, to withstand judicial scrutiny. It rested the distinction on
240 S.E.2d 686 (W. Va. 1977).
E.g., Citizens Bank of Weirton v. West Virginia Board of Banking & Financial Institutions, 233 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1977).
" 240 S.E.2d at 689.
8

" W. VA. CODE § 29A-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.) exempts the Public Service

Commission from all of the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Is 216 S.E.2d 566 (W. Va. 1975).
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the fact that the statutory provision relating to contract carriers
required the applicant to show that his proposed service would not
have a negative effect on the use, condition or safety of highways,
and would not impair the efficient service of existing common
carriers. The court noted that the applicant in Mountain Trucking
had not proven its case, perhaps indicating that the real distinction between the two cases is the support provided in the record
for the agency's decision.
The court stated that a lack of findings or reasons in the order
would not impede judicial scrutiny of the order, since the commission is required to file a statement of its reasons with the court on
appeal, and a transcript of the evidence considered by the agency
is also available to the court.1" However, the court did not deal with
the argument in Justice Miller's dissent" that findings are also
required to provide the disappointed party with knowledge of why
he lost his case, both for his own satisfaction and to allow him to
adequately prepare for a rehearing or judicial review. The court
also ignored its own statements in Citizens Bank of Weirton v.
5
that
West Virginia Board of Banking & FinancialInstitutions,"
the expression of detailed reasons for agency action is necessary to
assure that the action has a rational basis.
The constitutionality of West Virginia's implied consent law,
deeming operation of a motor vehicle to be consent by the driver
to chemical tests to determine intoxication, was affirmed by the
court in Jordan v. Roberts.' West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-1 authorizes suspension of a driver's license for a six month period if
the driver refuses to submit to a breath or urine test incident to a
lawful arrest by an officer with reasonable grounds to believe that
the driver was driving on a public highway while intoxicated. The
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is required to suspend the license
upon receipt of the officer's sworn affidavit that (1) he had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor; (2) the person was lawfully placed
under arrest for the offense of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor; (3) the person refused to submit to the test;
'

"

240 S.E.2d at 690.
Id. at 691.

,5233 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1977).
" 246 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1978). Although the court had previously dealt with

questions surrounding the admissibility into evidence of breathalyzer test results
in a criminal trial, State v. Dyer, 233 S.E.2d 309 (W. Va. 1977), State v. Byers, 224
S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1976), the constitutionality of the administrative revocation of
drivers licenses under the implied consent law had not previously been decided.
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and (4) the person was told that his license would be suspended
for a period of six months if he refused to submit to the testy The
driver has a right to a hearing before the commissioner, and may
appeal the commissioner's ruling to the courts.18 The agency hearing must comply with the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, West Virginia Code §§ 29A-5-1 through -5, and the
suspension order is stayed once the hearing procedures are invoked."l
The court concluded that although the suspension of a driver's
license is a substantial deprivation and must therefore be judged
0 standard, the procedural safeguards conaccording to the North"
tained in the statute satisfy that standard. However, the court
explicitly reserved an opinion on the constitutional questions arising from the use in a criminal trial of test results obtained under
the implied consent law.
III.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

In London v. Board of Review of the Departmentof Employment Security,21 the court struck down an agency regulation2
which required individuals to actively seek employment in order
to prove their availability for work and, thus, their eligibility for
unemployment compensation benefits. In ruling that the Department was without authority to add the work-seeking requirement
to the general statutory requirement that the individual be
"available for full-time work," the court held that "registration
with the state employment office would attest to and establish
'7
"

W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-3 (1974 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-4 (1974 Replacement Vol.).

"Id.
North v. Board of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977), requiring the following due

process procedures where deprivation of substantial rights is involved:
a formal written notice of charges; sufficient opportunity to prepare
to rebut the charges; opportunity to have retained counsel at any hearings
on the charge8, to confront his accusers, and to present evidence on his
own behalf; an unbiased hearing tribunal; and an adequate record of the

proceedings.
233 S.E.2d at 417.
11244 S.E.2d 331 (W. Va. 1978).
22 Regulations of the Commissioner, § 13.03 establishes, as a condition of eligibility, that the applicant "was unemployed, able and available for fulltime work
and was seeking work." (emphasis added).
2 The applicable provision of W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.),

requires that to be eligible for benefits, the claimant "is able to work and is available for full-time work for which he is fitted by prior training or experience."
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prima facie proof of availability; and that until a claimant refuses
a referral to work or otherwise demonstrates that he or she is not
available, his registration is proof enough."2
IV.

DISCRIMINATION

The powers of the state Human Rights Commission were expanded in West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Pearlman
Realty Agency, which held that the commission has the authority
to award damages for humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and
mental distress, and loss of personal dignity to a victim of discrimihas susnation in the sale of housing, even where the individual
28
tained no other loss due to the discriminatory action.
The commission's power to award compensatory damages was
first established by the court's ruling in West Virginia Human
Rights Commission v. Pauley,27 which limited such awards to actual monetary losses. In Pearlman Realty the court abandoned
that restriction, holding that the commission can award damages
for emotional distress even where there had been no other loss, if
the award is purely incidental to its use of other powers vested in
it by statute.
Dismissing the defendant's claim that such awards infringed
upon the constitutional right to a jury trial, the court noted that
judicial review of the agency action was available, and that it could
"comprehend no material difference between an expenditure of
$1,000.00 to compensate a person aggrieved, humiliated and embarrassed by a discriminator and the financial expenditure which
will result from the discriminator's compliance with the other
directives of the cease and desist order, such as notifying employees and others of the commission's order, keeping the records re2' 8
quired by the order, adjusting advertising, and such.
In dicta, the court suggested the availability of a civil remedy
when alleged damages are too extensive to fall within the commission's jurisdiction.2 9 The establishment of such a remedy for emo24244 S.E.2d at 338.
239 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1977).
n Opinions of other courts regarding whether a state human rights commission
possesses incidental power to award compensatory damages, absent specific statutory authorization, are divided. See Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md.
563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974) and cases cited therein.
2 212 S.E.2d 77 (W.Na. 1975).
2 239 S.E.2d at 147.
n Id. at 148.
"
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tional distress caused by discrimination could be a significant extention of the Monteleone" doctrine, which limits damages for
emotional distress to cases involving intentional torts.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
In State ex rel. Moran v. Ziegler,31 the court granted a writ of
prohibition staying the prosecution of a criminal defendant on the
grounds that his motion to disqualify the private prosecuting attorney had been improperly denied by the circuit court. The relator
claimed that immediately following the incident for which he was
being prosecuted, he had spoken on the telephone to the attorney
who subsequently prosecuted him. In that conversation the relator
had purportedly sought representation from the lawyer, who had
represented him before in other matters. The relator insisted that
at that time he also discussed with the attorney the facts and
circumstances of the incident. A subsequent meeting was planned,
but never occurred.
On the basis of these allegations, the relator claimed that the
lawyer's subsequent prosecution of the case was both a violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and a denial of relator's
due process right to a fair trial. Noting that both of these claims
rested on the assumption that an attorney-client relationship existed, the court was unable to agree with the relator's legal arguments. While admitting that the telephone call had taken place,
the private prosecutor denied that any communications as to the
facts or circumstances of the case had taken place during that
conversation. Instead, the attorney claimed that in the telephone
conversation the relator told him that there had been a shooting,
and that he was being sought by the police, but nothing more. A
subsequent meeting was arranged, at which the relator failed to
appear. Faced with such conflicting evidence, the court was unable
to hold that an attorney-client relationship existed.
The court focused on the appearance of an attorney-client
relationship."2 Ruling that the private prosecutor must be held to
the same high standards of fairness as a public prosecutor, the
court extended the holding of State v. Britton" "to cover situa31 Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475
(1945).
31244 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1978).
31Id. at 552.
- 203 S.E.2d 462 (W. Va. 1974). The court held that the general rule forbidding
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tions where there is the appearance of an attorney-client relationship between the accused and the prosecutor, either public or
private."'" While there was no finding of impropriety on the part
of Mr. Jones, the court stated there was the "appearance of impropriety in the nature of a conflict of interest which has a potential capacity to taint the record."35 Accordingly the court held
that the prosecution of the relator could not proceed until the
private prosecutor was disqualified.
The court pointed out that unlike the Britton rule, the holding
in State ex rel. Moran v. Ziegler does not rest on due process
guarantees, but rather "is based on the exercise of [the courts']
inherent powers to administer the judicial system, in which, as
stated above, the prosecution occupies an important quasi judicial
position." 6
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I.

PRISONER'S RIGHTS

In the past year, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
was confronted with several cases involving constitutional issues in
the context of the treatment of prisoners after their conviction. In
Tasker v. Griffith,37 a prisoner serving a one to ten year sentence
was administratively segregated on two separate occasions. Such
segregation involved isolation of the prisoner from the rest of the
inmate population and at least some deprivation of participation
in normal activities and privileges. At the time of the first segregation, which lasted for four days, the prisoner was told that he was
under investigation for involvement in certain acts of violence
which had occurred at the Huttonsville Correctional Center where
he was imprisoned. At the beginning of the second segregation,
which lasted three days, he was told that he was under investigation for receiving a contraband substance through the mail. He
brought a writ of habeas corpus contending that the procedure
followed in administrative segregation violated his rights to due
process.
an attorney to represent adverse or conflicting interests requires that a prosecuting
attorney may not attempt to counsel an accused for whose prosecution he is responsible.
31 244
35Id.

S.E.2d at 553.

Id. See also State v. Britton, 203 S.E.2d 462, 467 (W. Va. 1974).
v 238 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. 1977).
3
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The court first held, as a matter of procedure, that a writ of
habeas corpus included within its proper scope a prisoner's challenge to additional restrictions on his liberty imposed because of
conduct unrelated to his original conviction." The court, again as
a matter of procedure, held that a release of the prisoner prior to
a hearing on the writ does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to
hear the case and to grant what amounts to prospective declaratory relief. 9 The court noted that if such jurisdiction were destroyed by early release, any meaningful challenge to the procedure would be rendered impossible.
Turning to the substantive issues, the court first distinguished
this situation from that in which formal disciplinary procedures
have been initiated against the prisoner. Noting that this case
involved administrative segregation before such proceedings were
initiated, the court recognized that the rights to be afforded the
prisoner are also somewhat different. The court then outlined the
safeguards it considered necessary to protect due process before
placing a prisoner in administrative segregation." First, prison
authorities must advise the prisoner that he is under investigation
for misconduct and the specific misconduct must be disclosed,
unless such disclosure would be hazardous to the integrity of the
investigation. Second, when the investigation is concluded, the
authorities must advise the inmate whether he was exonerated or
whether formal disciplinary proceedings will be initiated against
him. The court stated that administrative segregation should not
be used as punishment when the safety of the institution, its inmates, staff or property or the integrity of the investigation is not
at stake. The court required that officials have specific reasons for
determining that effective investigation requires the isolation of an
inmate and further stated that if no specific reason can be articulated, administrative segregation is inappropriate. If administrative segregation is imposed, the prisoner should be afforded all
privileges and comforts possible as if he were not segregated. Finally, in order to prevent such segregation from being used as
punishment while still allowing adequate investigation, the court
limited the segregation period to a maximum of three days.
In Woodring v. Whyte"l the court considered another habeas
corpus proceeding in which seven inmates of the Huttonsville

'o

Id. at 231.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 234-35.

41242 S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1978).
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Correctional Center alleged that the warden had done nothing to
implement a statutory scheme providing for partial commutation
of sentence for good behavior.2 The legislation provided that, for
each institution, a classification committee was to be created to
classify "as soon as practicable" all prisoners into one of three
classes according to "industry, conduct and obedience."'
The court first agreed with the relators that the statute was
mandatory because of the word "shall" in its language. 4 The court
then upheld the statute against the warden's claims that it constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers because
it failed to set adequate standards for each of the three classifications. 5 The court stated that "to be unconstitutional, the delegation must be of purely legislative power."" The court also pointed
to the modem trend of allowing the legislature to set standards
broadly and to require less exactness in those standards. The court
held that the statutory standards of "industry, conduct and obedience" were sufficient.
The court, however, refused to apply the statute to the entire
sentence of prisoners who had served time before the statute had
been passed. The court said that application of the statute to prestatute time would be a retroactive application and was not warranted by the equal protection arguments of the relators. 7 Concluding that the right to time off for good behavior is a statutory
right rather than a constitutional one, the court noted that only a
rational basis was needed to justify a distinction between time
served before the statute and time served after the statute. Because this new system was designed to provide an incentive for a
prisoner to alter his behavior and because such an incentive did
not exist under the old system, the court concluded that the statutory distinction involved here had a rational basis."
In Conner v. Griffith" the court sustained a constitutional
challenge to a statute which permitted the Board of Probation and
Parole to re-imprison a parole violator without crediting the time
served on parole against the original sentence. After having
4'2See

W. VA. CODE § 28-5-28 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

a id.

11242

S.E.2d at 242.

a Id. at 244.

11Id. at 243.
'1 Id. at 244.
Id. at 245-46.
, 238 S.E.2d 529 (W. Va. 1977).
0 See W. VA. CODE § 62-12-19 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
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served part of a sentence for grand larceny and spending twentyone months on parole, the petitioner was arrested for a parole
violation and returned to Huttonsville Correctional Center to serve
the remaining portion of his original sentence without credit for the
twenty-one months served on parole. The petitioner brought a writ
of habeas corpus alleging that the statute violated the double jeopardy clause of the West Virginia Constitution"1 by failing to require
credit for time served on parole.
In sustaining the petitioner's contentions, the court viewed
parole as a continued, albeit reduced, restraint on the parolee's
freedom. The court also pointed out that, absent revocation, time
spent on parole is counted toward the original sentence. Finally,
the court concluded that the effect of not crediting time spent on
parole toward the original sentence is to increase the total time the
parolee is subject to serving. Because the violation of the terms of
parole cannot furnish the grounds for additional punishment unless the act is criminal in nature, the court deemed this effect to
be multiple punishment for the same offense and violative of the
double jeopardy clause. 2
In State v. Hersman the court again dealt with a challenge
to another statute based upon the double jeopardy clause of the
West Virginia Constitution." The court held that a person sentenced as a youthful male offender under West Virginia Code § 254-6 is constitutionally entitled to credit for time spent at a correctional center. 5 Upon a plea of guilty for possession of marijuana,
petitioner was sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of
Corrections as provided for under the challenged statute. After
having spent six months at the Davis Center, the superintendent
recommended that he be released and put on probation. This recommendation was subsequently withdrawn and the petitioner was
transferred to the Anthony Center presumably because of some
misconduct by the petitioner. One and one-half months later the
superintendent of Anthony Center informed the circuit court that
the petitioner had been found unfit under § 25-4-6 and requested
that he be returned to the circuit court for sentencing. Pursuant
to § 25-4-6 petitioner was sentenced to ninety days in the Wood
t

W. VA. CONST. art. I,§ 5.

12238 S.E.2d at 534.
242 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1978).
U W. VA. CONsT. art. I,§ 5.
13

5 242 S.E.2d at 561.
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County jail without credit for the time spent at the correctional
centers.
Although the statute left to the court's discretion the question
whether an "unfit" prisoner is to be given credit for time already
served, the court found it in conflict with the prohibition against
multiple punishment for the same offense embodied in the double
jeopardy clause. The court relied on past cases where time spent
on parole was found deserving of credit." Justification for such
credit is even stronger in a case like this where there are even
greater restrictions on the freedoms of the prisoner.
The court decided still another case involving the double jeopardy clause and the sentencing of a prisoner in Martin v.
Leverette. 7 The petitioner had been given a life sentence under the
Habitual Criminal Statute on the basis of three felony convictions, 8 the last of which was for burglary in 1970. One of the prior
convictions underlying the application of the Habitual Criminal
Statute was voided by the United States District Court. The life
sentence was also voided and the petitioner was resentenced to one
to fifteen years for the burglary conviction and five years for another prior felony conviction, to run consecutively. Although given
credit for time spent in jail serving the life sentence, petitioner was
not credited for the time spent prior to and after trial on the burglary charge." He brought a writ of habeas corpus charging a violation of the double jeopardy and equal protection clauses of the
West Virginia Constitution."
The court noted that the case was one of first impression and
that the statute under challenge left to the court's discretion the
question whether time spent in jail prior to and after trial was to
be credited against the sentence.8 Pointing to the modem trend,
the court stated that the failure to so credit a prisoner would constitute time spent in prison in excess of the sentence. As such, the
statute was violative of the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. 2 The court also found that
the discretion vested in the circuit courts was in violation of the
"Conner v. Griffith, 238 S.E.2d 529 (W. Va. 1977).
" 244 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1978).
MW. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
uThe failure to give such credit was permitted by W. VA. CODE § 61-11-24
(1977 Replacement Vol.).
0W. VA. CONST. art. m, §§ 10, 17.
11244 S.E.2d at 41.
2Id.

at 42.
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equal protection clause of the state constitution in that it makes
possible unequal treatment of people in the same or similar circumstances with no apparent justification. 63
Finally, in K. W. v. Werner" the court considered the contentions of two juveniles that their incarceration in the West Virginia
Industrial School for Boys at Pruntytown violated their right to
due process and the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment in the state and federal constitutions." At the time the petitions were filed, disciplinary practices at the institution included
confinement, floor time, bench time and the use of mace. While it
was admitted that the petitioners had been subjected to some of
these practices, it was also noted that such practices had been
abolished.
The court held that the use of bench time, floor time, and
mace was cruel and unusual punishment and therefore forbidden."
The court could find no adequate explanation why these practices
should be permitted when practiced by an institution when the
court would not hesitate to remove the child from such treatment
if practiced by a parent. Regarding confinement, the court stated
that "[s]olitary confinement is not to be used as a routine disciplinary procedure, but only in instances when physical restraint
and isolation of a juvenile are absolutely necessary to enable him
to gain personal control over himself."' 7
The court held, however, that there was too severe a lack of
evidence to find incarceration at Pruntytown in itself unconstitutional." The court seemed unwilling to take such drastic action in
the absence of a positive showing of serious shortcomings.
II.

UTILITY RATE INCREASES

In State ex rel. Knight v. Public Service Commission" a customer of a public utility unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of a statute allowing public utilities to file rate increases
with the West Virginia Public Service Commission and to place
the increase into operation after 30 days, or after an additional 120
a Id.
- 242 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
" U.S. CONST. amends. VIH, XIV; W. VA. CONST. art. E[[, §§ 5, 10.
" 242 S.E.2d at 911.
Id. at 916.
"Id. at 915.
"245 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1978).
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day suspension at the commission's option." The statute provided,
however, that a bond be posted to guarantee a refund with interest
to customers for that portion of the increase which might ultimately be disapproved by the commission. The commission had
failed to conclude hearings on the reasonableness of a rate increase
filed by Monongahela Power Company within the 150 day suspension period and the increase went into effect. The customer sought
to prevent the commission from following a statutory scheme
which he contended violated the constitutional provisions protecting his right to substantive and procedural due process.7'
With regard to the petitioner's substantive due process claims,
the court agreed that there was a common law right to reasonable
rates charged by state-created monopolies, but pointed out that
the legislature was at liberty to choose any reasonable method
available to it to protect that right. The court drew a strong analogy between the statute challenged here and similar provisions
in the Interstate Commerce Act.72 In both statutes the suspension
period for a rate increase was limited in order to protect the utility
from losing large amounts of revenue that could not be recouped.
To protect its customers, the utility is required to post a bond for
repayment of that part of the increase later found to be unjustified.
The court pointed out that irreparable harm could be done to
utilities, especially small ones, if they are not allowed rate increases subject to refund. If severe enough, this harm could cause
an interruption of vital services to a great number of people. Finally, too much of a delay in effectuating rate increases would have
the effect of distributing present utility costs among future users
rather than present users. Thus, the court found the statutory
73
scheme reasonable.
Turning to the petitioner's procedural due process argument,
the court relied on the three-part test as enunciated in North v.
Board of Regents.7 First, the more valuable the right to be deprived, the more safeguards will be interposed. The court found
that the amount of the petitioner's money at stake here was not
large even in comparison to his $600 per month income. Second,
due process protection must be afforded before deprivation unless
a compelling public policy dictates otherwise. The court consid§ 24-2-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CONST. art. Hm,
§ 10.
49 U.S.C. § 15(7).
245 S.E.2d at 152.
71233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
70 W. VA. CODE
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ered the policy of protecting utilities to insure their continued
operation a sufficiently compelling public policy to justify denying
the ratepayer his money pending termination of the proceedings.
Third, temporary deprivation may not require as large a measure
of due process protection as will permanent deprivation. The court
pointed out that the deprivation in this case was only temporary
and that provision was made in the statutory scheme to correct it.
The court concluded from the North test, as applied to the facts
of this case and the challenged statute, that the petitioner's claims
75
of unconstitutionality were not sufficient.
I.

JUDICIAL BUDGET-DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICES

In State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship,75 the court was faced
with an unusual constitutional issue involving the power of the
legislature over the budget of the judiciary. The Supreme Court of
Appeals had submitted the judicial budget request to the state
auditor and it had been processed through the Department of Finance and Administration. The request was then submitted to the
legislature with the rest of the budget bill by the governor. The
judicial budget, as finally passed by the legislature, showed a decrease in five of the line items and reflected a total reduction of
approximately $1.7 million from the original request. Two attorneys subsequently sought a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk
of the House of Delegates to publish a constitutionally correct
budget bill without the decreases attempted by the legislature.
The mandamus was predicated on the state constitutional provision which prohibits the legislature from decreasing line items relating to the judiciary."
Before the substantive issues were considered, the court was
faced with what might be termed a procedural issue of constitutional dimensions. Four of the five justices had disqualified themselves from deciding the case and the panel had been reconstituted by retired judges and other eligible jurists for the purpose of deciding this case. 8 The respondent in the action had requested that the remaining justice, Darrell V. McGraw, disqualify
himself or, in the alternative, be disqualified by the court under
75 245 S.E.2d at 153. For further discussion of State ex rel. Knight v. Public
Service Comm'n see Case Comment, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 139 (1978).
76246 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1978).

W. VA. CONST. art. VI,

§

51.

7' The panel was constituted in accordance with the provisions of W. VA.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 8.
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Article VIII, section 8 of the state constitution because of bias,
prejudice, partiality and due process violations. Justice McGraw
could find no reason to disqualify himself, and the temporary panel
deferred to the court in the resolution of this question. The court"
could find no authority in the provision to disqualify a judge or
justice in any particular case such as this even in light of comments
made by the justice before the case was heard. Although the court
suggested that restraint be exercised in commenting on legislative
action out of which future litigation might develop, it refused to
limit the right to comment on matters of public interest. The court
also stated that the disqualifications of a judge or justice to hear
and determine the issues in any particular litigation would be
considered under the Judicial Code of Ethics promulgated by the
court. Finally, the court pointed out that the salaries of the justices
were not in question in this particular case since they were set by
statute and are independent of the budget request. Thus, the potential for personal interest is substantially reduced.
Turning to the main issue, the court gave little credence to the
respondent's contention that, because the state auditor never certified the judicial budget request, it was never constitutionally
before the legislature during the 1978 regular session. The court
pointed out that the request was transmitted to the state auditor,
processed through the Department of Finance and Administration
and submitted by the governor to the legislature as part of the
state budget. The court concluded that the legislature's acceptance of the request and the extensive review given to it showed that
the legislature considered the request constitutionally before it.
The respondent's assertion that to void the decreases would be
to violate another constitutional provision" prohibiting the causing of a budget deficit was also rejected by the court. It was not
shown, but only asserted, that such action by the court would
cause such a deficit. Moreover, the court pointed out that the
judicial budget comprised only a small part of the entire state
budget and that it was unlikely that this small part could be the
determining cause of a deficit in so large a budget.
Finally, the court emphatically rejected the respondent's contention that the judicial budget request was improper, unreasonable and constituted an abuse of discretion and had thus lost any
constitutional protection it might have had. The court noted that
" 246 S.E.2d at 106. As to this issue, Justice McGraw disqualified himself.

B W. VA.

CONST. art. VI, § 51.
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the 1974 Judicial Reorganization Amendment gave the Supreme
Court of Appeals general supervisory control over the state's entire
court system.8 1 The court pointed to increased services, better
administration, expanded educational programs and other factors
as justifying the budgetary increase. Finally, the court pointed to
the express language of the constitutional provision which precludes any legislative decrease in the judicial budget as evidence
of a clear intent on the part of the framers and the people who
adopted it to preclude both legislative and executive alteration of
the judicial budget once the request is submitted to the state auditor. The court recognized the large degree of independence the
holding in this case gives the court over its own budgetary matters,
and pointed out only that the justices must ultimately answer to
the electorate.
As a final matter, the court held that the duty of the respondent clerk of the House of Delegates is clear and nondiscretionary. 2 As such, mandamus was deemed to be proper to
require the discharge by a public officer of a non-discretionary
duty.,
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT

In State ex rel. Daily Mail PublishingCo. v. Smith 4 two newspapers had printed stories naming a juvenile charged in the fatal
shooting of a student at a local junior high school. The prosecuting
attorney sought and obtained indictments against the newspapers
for violating West Virginia Code § 49-7-3 which forbids any newspaper from publishing the name of a child in connection with any
juvenile proceeding without the permission of the trial court. The
newspapers initiated proceedings to prohibit the respondent judges
of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County from prosecuting the
petitioners under the code provision. The petitioners contended
that the statute constituted a prior restraint on publications and
was repugnant to article Ill, § 7 of the West Virginia Constitution
which is the state counterpart to the first amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Although the normal course would be to decide the constituN Id.

W. VA. CODE § 4-1-13 (1971 Replacement Vol.).
" For further discussion of State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship see Case
Comment, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 159 (1978).
u 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978).
'"

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 7
[Vol. 81

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

tional questiori on state grounds, the court preferred to rely on the
well-developed body of federal law rather than on an essentially
non-existent body of state law on the subject. The court noted that
the idea that state constitutional law is ordinarily to be used to
afford broader protection than that afforded by federal law was not
applicable in this case because federal law in this area is already
quite broad in the protection it provides. In addition, the court
preferred to use federal law because of the interrelationships
among the various news media some of which are governed primarily by federal law. The use of state law might result in a loss of
uniformity in the resolution of these issues throughout the United
States.
With regard to the petitioners' challenge to the statute, the
court first pointed to the United States Supreme Court's statement of the rule regarding prior restraint of free speech as stated
in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart.u In that case the court said
"any prior restraint comes to this court with a 'heavy presumption'
against its constitutional validity." 8 The court in Daily Mail
clearly intended to follow this language. Indeed, the court suggests
that the United States Supreme Court would probably go so far as
to say that, except for pornography, there is no governmental interest sufficiently compelling to justify a prior restraint in times of
peace.
The court rejected the state's argument that a child's interest
in anonymity and the state's interest in assuring him a future free
from prejudice are sufficiently compelling to permit the statute
under review to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The court
stated that the United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that private interests were not sufficiently compelling to permit a
prior restraint. For example, the court pointed to Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court" in which a state court enjoined the
news media from publishing the name or photograph of a juvenile
pending a proceeding in the juvenile system under a statute similar
to the one under review here. The United States Supreme Court
held the prior restraint unconstitutional despite the interests of the
youth in maintaining his anonymity. The court also referred to Cox
BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohen" in which the United States Supreme

"

427 U.S. 539 (1976).
Id. at 558, citing with approval Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,

402 U.S. 415 (1971).
a 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
91420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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Court held that a tort action for invasion of privacy grounded upon
a newspaper's publication of the name of a rape victim (which was
a matter of public record) was an unconstitutional restraint in
spite of the legitimate state interest in protecting innocent people
from embarrassment. Thus relying on these precedents, the court
held the statute in question unconstitutional.
CONTRACTS
In Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 89 the Supreme Court of Appeals decided the appropriate statute of limitations for a suit to collect a penalty for usurious interest and the
time when the appropriate statute begins to run. 0 The plaintiffs
purchased a mobile home on an installment payment contract
dated September 15, 1972. The contract provided for ninety-six
monthly payments, the first payment falling due on October 30,
1972. The plaintiffs instituted a suit against the seller of the mobile
home, its manufacturer, and General Electric Corporation, the
financer, on May 3, 1974, alleging that the contract for the loan
was made at a greater rate of interest than that permitted by law?'
The circuit court granted summary judgment against the
plaintiffs, holding that a one year statute of limitations was applicable and that the statute began to run on the date of the agreement; thus the suit was barred since it was filed more than one
year after the date of the agreement. 2 The court unanimously
agreed that a one year statute of limitations was applicable," but
reversed the circuit court's decision as to when the statute began
to run, ruling that the debtor has the right to bring suit under West
Virginia Code § 47-6-6 at any time until one year after the last
payment is due or made on the usurious contract."
The court reasoned that the recovery allowed on a usurious
contract was correctly characterized as a penalty since (1) recovery
244 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1978).
Id. at 322.
" W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides in part: "All contracts and assurances made directly or indirectly for the loan or forebearance of
money or other thing at a greater rate of interest than is permitted by law shall be
void as to all interest provided for in any such contract or assurance, and the
borrower or debtor may, in addition, recover from the original lender or creditor or
other holder not in due course an amount equal to four times all interest agreed to
be paid and in any event a minimum of one hundred dollars."
"

12 244 S.E.2d at 322.
93 Id.
"1

Id. at 327.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

is statutorily created and is imposed as punishment for a specific
act made unlawful by the statute and (2) the amount authorized
as a penalty ordinarily bears no relationship to the harm done."
At the time the suit was instituted there was no specific statute of
limitations applicable to the collection of penalties. The court reasoned that a suit to collect a penalty is a personal action, possessing neither common law survivability" nor statutory survivability:" therefore the controlling statute of limitations is West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(c), providing for a one year limitation on the
right to bring the suit."
The court then brought West Virginia into the majority position regarding when the statute begins to run.' 9 Even though the
cause of action accrues on the date the usurious agreement is
signed, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until the last payment is due or made on the usurious
contract. The court felt a liberal rule construing the statute in
favor of the debtor was warranted since usury is against public
policy and the legislative intent supports such a construction.'1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
I.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The court has shown its concern for the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures"' in three recent opinions. In
order to assure the vitality of this guarantee the court emphasized
and strengthened the procedural requirements for a valid search.
The defendant in State v. McKinney'" appealed his conviction for first degree murder and assigned as one of the errors the
trial court's refusal to suppress evidence obtained through a war" Id. at 323. The same concept was previously discussed in Wilson v. Shrader,
73 W. Va. 105, 79 S.E. 1083 (1913) and Gawthrop v. Fairmont Coal Co., 74 W. Va.
39, 81 S.E. 560 (1914).
"244 S.E.2d at 323. See State ex rel. Sabatino v. Richards, 127 W. Va. 703,
34 S.E.2d 271 (1945).
" 244 S.E.2d at 325. See W. VA. CoDE § 55-7-8a(a) (1966).
" 244 S.E.2d at 325.
" Id. at 326.
I" Id. In determining the intent of the legislature the court looked to W. VA.
CODE §§ 47-6-6 through -9 (1976 Replacement Vol.). The court also felt that since
the defense of bona fide error was available to the creditor at any time during the
life of the agreement, then the debtor should be treated similarly. See W. VA. CODE
§ 47-6-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'' U. S. CONsr. amend. IV; W. VA. CONST. art. m, § 6.
'"244 S.E.2d 808 (W. Va. 1978).
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rantless search of his home and place of business. Although he had
signed a consent to the search, the trial court failed to make a
determination as to the voluntariness of this consent. In reversing
the conviction and remanding for a new trial the court said:
Such determination is of vital importance in the absence of a
search warrant. We are of the opinion that, as in the case of a
confession, the trial court must, even in the absence of a specific
request, determine the voluntariness of a consent to search executed by the defendant before the evidence obtained by the
search can be introduced."'
The mandatory requirement for a hearing, with or without a
request by the defendant, is a break from the rule set out in State
v. Harr' that a hearing on the admissibility of evidence is necessary only when the defendant challenges the lawfulness of the
search. By surrounding a signed consent to search with the same
procedural protection that surrounds the admission of a confession, the court is apparently adopting the position of State v.
Wills ' that evidence obtained in a search can amount to and be
as damaging as a statement made by the defendant. Before admitting into evidence any matter obtained directly from the defendant
the court wants to be certain that the defendant voluntarily surrendered that matter.'"
The issue in State v. Frisby' was whether the initial stopping
of the defendant's automobile was legal. City police stopped his
van because it bore a license plate which did not appear to have a
state-of-origin identification."' While the police were checking the
Id. at 810.
104156 W. Va. 492, 194 S.E.2d 652 (1973).
M 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922).
10

I It is interesting to note that the cases cited by the court to support its
requirement of a hearing to determine voluntariness, State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710
(W. Va. 1977); State v. Plantz, 155 W. Va. 24, 180 S.E.2d 614 (1971); State v.
Fortner, 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966), all dealt with hearings to determine
the voluntariness of confessions. They required that the statements be voluntary

in the Mirandasense, i.e., that the defendant be advised of his constitutional rights
and be given an opportunity to exercise them. One wonders whether the court

intends to apply the same standard to consent to search cases and require that the
defendant be informed that he has the constitutional right not to consent and to
require a search warrant or whether it will continue to apply the rule in State v.
Basham, 223 S.E.2d 53 (W. Va. 1976), that a defendant does not have to be so

informed before he can grant a valid consent to search.
1-245 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1978).
'u The license plate had a number on it with the letters BLMO superimposed.

Upon investigation it was learned that the letters stood for "beyond the limits of
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registration one of them noticed a rifle in plain view inside the van
and smelled marijuana. The defendant was arrested and a search
warrant was obtained. The police found 175 pounds of marijuana
in the vehicle. The defendant was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver.
The court said that although the police may stop a motorist
to examine his license and registration without violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, such a stop will
be valid only if it is based upon a reasonable ground to believe that
such an investigation is necessary or if it is done on a random basis
according to a preconceived plan. Such a stop cannot be used as a
pretext to make what would otherwise be an unwarranted intrusion. ' It held that in this instance the detention of the defendant
was based on reasonable grounds because of the peculiarity of the
registration plate with which the average police officer would not
be familiar. Therefore the evidence seized as a result of the stop
was not tainted.
This was a case of first impression in West Virginia on the
question of when the police may legally stop an automobile. It is
generally accepted that the stopping of a car to check the driver's
license and registration is a seizure."' Therefore, if the police are
going to stop a car they must have reasonable grounds to believe
that the occupants have committed a traffic violation;"' or have
committed or are about to commit a crime;"' or the stop must be
based on a nonarbitrary, uniform procedure for checking licenses
and registrations."' The court was obviously concerned with the
use of motor vehicle licensing laws as a pretext for conducting what
would otherwise be unlawful searches to discover evidence of violations of other laws. To avoid this possibility, the court decided to
apply the Terry v. Ohio"' standard to determine when there may
Missouri" and that the license plate was a special one issued to vehicles registered
in Missouri but operated outside of that state. Id. at 624, 626.
"' Id. at 625.
" E.g., People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975);
68 Am. Jur.2d Search & Seizures § 34 (1973).
" See People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Ct.
App. 1975); State v. Johnson, 26 Or. App. 599, 554 P.2d 194 (1976); Faulkner v.
State, 549 S.W.2d 1 (Crim. App. Tex. 1977).
11 State v. Bastardo, 347 So.2d 463 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1977); Faulkner v.
State, 549 S.W.2d 1 (Crim. App. Tex. 1977).
I' Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962); People v. Ingle, 36
N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975).
" 392 U.S. 1 (1967). The police have to be able to point to specific facts which
would cause a reasonable man to believe that the intrusion on the freedom of the
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be a warrantless stopping of an automobile.
In State v. McNeal,"5 in which the defendant appealed his
conviction of robbery by violence, the court strongly restated its
requirement that a search in order to be reasonable and therefore
lawful must be made, except in a few recognized exigent circumstances, pursuant to a search or arrest warrant. The police, after
being informed that the defendant had been seen running from the
vicinity of a robbery, went to a house looking for the defendant.
They knocked on the door and then waited five or ten minutes
until someone replied but refused to open the door. Believing that
the person inside was the defendant, they requested and received
permission from a superior officer to enter the house. They then
proceeded to kick down the door and search the house. They seized
a paring knife which was introduced into evidence at the trial.
The court reversed the conviction, stating that the defendant
had been arrested unlawfully and therefore any evidence obtained
pursuant to this unlawful arrest was inadmissible at the defendant's trial."8 Although the opinion is not clear as to whether the
principle objection of the court is the failure to obtain a search
warrant or the failure to obtain an arrest warrant, what is clear is
that the police must have one or the other before they may conduct
a lawful search." 7 Only those exigent circumstances listed in State
v. Duvernoy"5 will excuse a warrantless search. Furthermore, the
court indicates that it will define exigent circumstances very narrowly"9 and if it appears that there is the opportunity to obtain a
warrant (either a search warrant or an arrest warrant) then one
must be obtained in order to conduct a lawful search.
II. DiscovERy
20

In State v. Sette' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the 1975 conviction of Laurence Hugh Sette as an
individual is warranted and that the manner of the intrusion is appropriate to the
circumstances.
115251 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1978).
"'

Id. at 489.
Id. at 488.
I7

"' 156 W. Va. 578, 584, 195 S.E.2d 631, 635 (1973). The exceptions are an
automobile in motion, searches made in hot pursuit, searches around the area
where the arrest is made, things that are obvious to the senses, property that has
been abandoned, and searches which are consented to.
"'

251 S.E.2d at 488-89.

'

242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978).
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accessory before the fact to murder in the first degree. In addition
to dealing with issues concerning venue, the criteria to be considered in ruling on the admissibility of inflammatory evidence, and
impeachment of prosecution witnesses by prior inconsistent statements, the Sette decision continued the court's liberal approach in
protecting the rights of criminal defendants by holding that
"absent compelling circumstances, once a prosecution witness has
testified, a defendant upon proper motion is entitled to have, for
the purpose of cross-examination, any written statements of the
witness in the State's possession."'"' The court went on to say that
"the defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to study
the statements and prepare cross-examination."'
The defense counsel had made several timely motions to obtain a written confession, implicating Sette as an accessory before
the fact, signed by the state's primary witness. The trial judge
examined the statement in chambers and concluded that it contained nothing which would exculpate the defendant. The trial
court, therefore, denied each of defense counsel's motions to review
the statement for the purpose of cross-examination.
Although pretrial discovery in criminal cases is within the
sound discretion of the trial court,'2 there have been substantial
inroads into this discretionary area.1u In Sette the court agreed
with the trial judge that the statement did not contain exculpatory
material, noted that the statement had not been used to refresh
the witness' recollection on the witness stand, but nevertheless
found that defense counsel, not the trial judge, was the better
party to determine whether the prior statement would be useful for
cross-examination purposes.

"

Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 471.

1'3

State v. Cowan, 156 W. Va. 827, 197 S.E.2d 641 (1973).

'

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)(holding that the matters known to
the prosecution which are obviously exculpatory in nature or which may be relevant
and favorable to the defendant must be made available to the defendant); State v.
Dudick, 213 S.E.2d 458 (W. Va. 1975) (holding that after a witness has testified from
notes used to refresh his recollection, the defense is absolutely entitled to inspect
the notes from which the witness testified and must be given a reasonable opportun.
ity to prepare cross examination); State v. Smith, 156 W. Va. 385, 193 S.E.2d 550
(1972) (defendant has a right to a sample of confiscated contraband, alleged to have
been in his possession, for independent scientific evaluation); State v. Cowan, 156
W. Va. 827, 197 S.E.2d 641 (1973)(failure of the prosecution to disclose a letter
written by the defendant even though obtained during trial is grounds for a new
trial when such non-disclosure is prejudicial).
121
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The court made it clear that in West Virginia there is to be a
liberal policy of discovery in criminal cases. The court noted that
"[tihere are some circuits in this State in which there are almost
no reversals of criminal trials, and that is because the trial judge
grants every reasonable request relating to discovery, rulings in
limine, evidence, and other discretionary matters during the
trial."l25
I.

PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION

In State v. McNeal,'2 the defendant had been convicted of
robbery by violence. He, along with another man, had allegedly
robbed a gas station by sloshing gasoline through the window of the
station and waiting with a knife for the attendant to exit. Sometime after the robbers had fled the scene the police went to the
defendant's residence, kicked in the door, and handcuffed the defendant. Later, the attendant was brought to the house and spontaneously identified the defendant, who was sitting in a chair
handcuffed with two other black men standing beside him.
The defendant's conviction was reversed by the court on
grounds that evidence gained through unlawful search and seizure
and a confession obtained in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution were admitted into
evidence. The court agreed that the one-on-one showing of a handcuffed suspect, surrounded by police in a home forcibly entered,
was.suggestive and unnecessary, but rejected a per se rule of exclusion. The test applied was that adopted in State v. Casdorph:l
[W]hether the identification was reliable, even though the
confrontation procedure was suggestive, with due regard given
to such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation."'
The court, considering these factors in light of the facts of the case,
held that there was no error in the admission of the evidence of the
identification.
I, 242 S.E.2d at 473.
In 251 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1978).

1" 230 S.E.2d 476 (W. Va. 1976).
112Id. at court syllabus point 3.
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IV.

INDICTMENTS

In State v. Furnerln the defendant was indicted for assault
and battery. The indictment read in relevant part: "Fumer... in
and upon one Fray Queen, Jr., an assault did make ... and him,

the said Fray Queen, Jr., did then and there strike, beat and batter, cut and wound, with intent him, the said Fray Queen, Jr., to
maim, disfigure and kill.""' At his trial, the defendant was found
guilty of assault and battery.
The defendant moved to quash the indictment on the grounds
that it averred that the victim, rather than the defendant, committed the offense, and that the omission of the defendant's name
from the charging part of the indictment was an incurable defect.,,
The trial court denied the motion and the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed its action.
The court noted that the defendant did not allege that he was
not plainly informed of the charges against him. The defense relied
on State ex rel. McCormick v. Hall'32 which had held a similar
defect to be fatal and incurable. The court in overruling
McCormick held "as long as the accused is plainly and fully informed that he is accused of a crime against a person named, the
transposition of names in the videlicet clause of the indictment is
not a fatal defect."1'
The court noted that the indictment clearly stated the nature
and cause of the accusation against the defendant which would
enable him to prepare his defense and plead his conviction as a bar
to later prosecution for the same offense.' 3' The court went on to
state: "In the past, courts often voided convictions in cases like
these, while overlooking the most sensitive and flagrant abuses of
citizens by their governments. We intend to correct this misdirec3
tion, wherever possible, hoping that we always recognize it."' 5
V.

IMPEACHMENT

When a witness testifies, the credibility of his testimony is
subject to challenge by the introduction of evidence of prior stater, 245 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1978).
'

Id. at 619.

'3'

Id.

1

150 W. Va. 385, 146 S.E.2d 520 (1966).

" 245 S.E.2d at 619.

lu Id.
InId. at 619-20.
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ments made by the witness which are inconsistent with his testimony at trial. 3 ' Prior to the decision of State v. Sette,"7 the rule
in West Virginia provided that the impeachment of a witness by
prior inconsistent statements could be accomplished only when the
proper foundation had been laid during cross-examination of the
witness.'u Establishing the proper foundation consisted of informing the witness of the alleged statement and the circumstances
under which it was said to have been made with sufficient certainty to enable the witness to identify the particular occasion." 9
At trial, the defendant attempted to introduce certain testimony by Denman Kelley. The proffered testimony was, in effect,
that the state's witness Kathy West had told him that Sette had
nothing to do with the murder. The statement was alleged to have
been made while Kelley and West were incarcerated in the Monongalia County jail. The trial court sustained objections by the state
to the introduction of the testimony on the grounds that counsel
for Sette had failed to establish the foundation for such testimony
during cross-examination of Miss West. Justice Neely, writing for
the court, stated: "We disagree that such a foundation was essential as a precondition to the admission of this evidence, which was
highly probative of the most important secondary fact in issue,
namely whether Kathy West was a liar.""'
In support of the foundation requirement, it has been said that
it: (1) avoids unfair surprise to the accused; (2) saves time, in that
an admission by the witness may make the proof unnecessary; and
(3) gives the witness a fair chance to explain the alleged discrepancy."' However, as the courts have expanded the quest for full
development of all relevant evidence on the issues, the requirement of confrontation on cross-examination has been attacked as
a cumbersome procedural restriction on the development of pertinent evidence."' As a result of these attacks on the foundation
requirement, the rigid application of the requirement has been
relaxed and made discretionary in some instances.' 3 The adoption
'u State v. Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1975); State v. Carduff, 142 W.
Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502 (1956).
Ia242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978).
'I State v. Carduff, 142 W. Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502 (1956).
tat Id.
"' 242 S.E.2d at 471-72.
"M

McCohaicK, EvmEcE § 37 (2d ed. 1972).

M"
3A WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 1027 (Chadborn rev. 1975).
M The UNWoRm RULE OF EVmIENc 22(b) provides:
Extrinsic evidence of prior contradictory statements whether oral or writ-
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of Rule 613 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reflects the modem
flexible approach to confrontation, in that the witness must merely
be afforded an opportunity to explain and the opposing party an
opportunity to examine on the inconsistent statement without regard to the sequence of these events.' The majority of jurisdictions retain the rigid confrontation on cross-examination requirement, however." 5
With its decision on the confrontation foundation requirement
in Sette, the West Virginia court appears to go beyond the modem
trend reflected in Rule 613 to a complete abolition of the necessity
to lay a foundation for subsequent impeachment of a witness during the cross-examination of such witness. It is significant to note
that the court does not mention Rule-613 or any other authority
for its decision to abolish the foundation requirement but in doing
so it summarily overrules a long line of case precedent in West
Virginia' without much discussion of the impact of its decision.
The treatment of the issue appears cursory in comparison to the
discussion of the other issues which influence the ultimate decision. With such minimum comment by the court on this issue, it
is difficult to ascertain the full extent to which the court abolished
the requirement of laying a foundation for impeachment of a witness during cross-examination.
While the Sette decision apparently removes a procedural requirement from counsel, the practical impact of the decision on the
development of impeachment evidence may be somewhat limited.
Even though under Sette counsel is no longer required to lay the
foundation for impeachment during cross-examination, it may
nevertheless be desirable to do so. The impeachment value of the
testimony which contradicts the witness may be heightened if preceded by a denial of the statement by the witness. An explanation
following a denial is likely to be more damaging to the credibility
of the witness than an explanation subsequent to confrontation
with the statement where the witness was not questioned about the
statement on cross-examination.
ten, made by the witness, may in the discretion of the judge be excluded
unless the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an
opportunity to identify, explain or deny the statement.
'" FED. R. Evm. 613, Comment (b).
See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 599 (1957).
"' State v. Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655 (W.Va. 19751 and cases cited therein at
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VI.
A.

EVIDENCE

Voluntary Confession

The court in 1977 and 1978 handed down several decisions
intended to clarify prior decisions on the admissibility of guilty
pleas and evidence rather than to break new ground. In Thomas
v. Leverette"7 the petitioner appealed the denial of his writ of
habeas corpus which he had filed after he had pleaded guilty to
second degree murder. One of the grounds for appeal was the trial
court's failure to meet the requirements of Call v. McKenzie""
when it accepted his guilty plea. In accepting his plea, the trial
court conducted a rather perfunctory questioning of the petitioner
before accepting his plea as being voluntary.
The court reversed and remanded the case for further hearings
because from the record it could not determine whether the petitioner's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. It stated
that under the due process clause of the West Virginia Constitu"
tion, 49
' in order for a defendant to enter a plea of guilty he must
understand the nature of the charge against him. The court is
required to explain all the elements of the crime charged, including
intent. Failure to do so will mean that the defendant does not have
a complete understanding of the charge against him and consequently his guilty plea can not be voluntary.'
West Virginia has long required that before a guilty plea is
accepted the trial court must be sure that the defendant is entering
the plea voluntarily and with a full understanding of the nature of
the charge against him.' Call v. McKenzie was intended to set out
what information must be conveyed to the defendant to insure that
he has the requisite understanding of the charges against him and
of his constitutional rights. By requiring that the defendant be
informed that intent is an element of the crime charged, this decision will help assure the defendant's full understanding. Further,,? 239 S.E.2d 500 (W. Va. 1977).
220 S.E.2d 665 (f. Va. 1975). Call suggested that specific inquiries should

Ia

be made of the defendant at the time his guilty plea is taken.
"' W. VA. CONST. art. IT, § 10, which states "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers."
15 239 S.E.2d at 503.
13 State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, 154 W. Va. 857, 179 S.E.2d 726 (1971); Nicely
v. Butcher, 81 W. Va. 247, 94 S.E. 147 (1917); State v. Stevenson, 67 W. Va. 553,
68 S.E. 286 (1910).
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more, it brings the state in line with the United States Supreme
Court decision of Henderson v. Morgan.'5
B. IncriminatingStatements-In Camera Hearing
The court rendered what would at first appear to be two contradictory opinions on the necessity of an in camera hearing to
determine the voluntariness of incriminating statements made by
the defendant before allowing them to be introduced into evidence.
Wilhelm v. Whyte'0 was an original habeas corpus proceeding in
which the petitioner sought to overturn his conviction for second
degree murder. One of the alleged errors was that without first
holding an in camera hearing to determine the voluntariness of the
defendant's statements, the trial court allowed several witnesses to
testify that the petitioner had stated at the scene of the crime that
he had shot the decedent. Where the statements were made prior
to any action taken by the police, the court held that based upon
the rule established in State v. Johnson'54 it was not necessary to
hold an in camera hearing before admitting the spontaneous statements into evidence. 5 Therefore no error had been committed and
the writ for habeas corpus was denied.
In State v. Sanders,' however, the court held that the trial
court had erred by failing to hold an in camera hearing to determine the voluntariness of incriminating statements. The defendant had appealed her conviction for first degree murder and assigned as one of the errors the failure of the trial court to hold a
hearing on the question of. the voluntariness of statements she
made to a friend. At the time the statements were made the defendant was in a hospital, under police custody, being treated for an
attempted suicide. She had been diagnosed by a hospital psychiatrist as "suicidally depressed and mentally ill."'" The court stated
that based on several of its prior decisions" 8 an in camera hearing
152426 U.S. 637 (1976). The Supreme Court held that a guilty plea to second
degree murder was involuntary and therefore constitutionally defective as a denial
of due process because the state court had failed to inform the defendant that intent
was an element of the crime.
'M

239 S.E.2d 735 (W. Va. 1977).

1- 226 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1976).
'" In Wilhelm, the court after citing Johnson said: "There, we held that a
spontaneous statement by a defendant prior to any action by a police officer and
before an accusation, arrest or any custodial interrogation is made or undertaken,
may be admitted into evidence without first holding an in camera hearing to determine its voluntariness." 239 S.E.2d at 740.
'" 242 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1978).
"5

Id. at 556.

'"State v. Johnson, 226 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1976); State v. Starr, 216 S.E.2d
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on the voluntariness of admissions or confessions of a defendant
was required. It specifically held that:
In a trial for murder where the defendant raises insanity as the

sole defense, the court upon request should conduct an in
camera hearing to determine whether incriminating statements
made by the defendant to a third party while in a hospital
emergency room shortly after committing the homicide, attempting suicide, and having been diagnosed by the attending
staff psychiatrist as "suicidally depressed and mentally ill,"
were voluntary and admissible into evidence. " '
It would at first appear rather difficult to reconcile some of the

language used by the court in State v. Sanders with the decision
in Wilhelm v. Whyte. In Sanders the court rather emphatically
said that in camera hearings on voluntariness of incriminating
statements are mandatory regardless of to whom they are made.
In Sanders, however, the defendant was in police custody when she
made the incriminating statements. In State v. Johnson the court
had specifically held that it was this fact of police custody that
made the difference between whether or not an in camera hearing
was required. 6 Therefore, based on this difference in circumstances between Wilhelm and Sanders and the court's statement in
Wilhelm that Johnson was directly applicable, it is evident that
the court is not willing to change its position that a hearing on
voluntariness is not mandatory when incriminating statements are
made before the police have taken any action in regard to the
defendant. The more difficult problem is trying to reconcile the
holding in Sanders with prior decisions. The holding certainly indicates that an in camera hearing is required only if the defendant
requests it and that absent such a request the trial court is not
required to hold one on its own motion. This goes against the very
strong statements in State v. Smith,'6 State v. Starr,6 2 and State
242 (W. Va. 1975); Spaulding v. Warden, 212 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1975); State v.
Smith, 212 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1975); State v. Fortner, 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d
669 (1966).
', 242 S.E.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
"' 226 S.E.2d at 445-46.
16 "Such a determination [the voluntariness of a confession] must be made
by the trial court before a confession may be heard by a jury whether the defendant
requests the hearing or not." 212 S.E.2d at 762. "[Ifn relation to the admissibility
of statements made by one being interrogated by the police,. . . no distinction can
be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which
amount to admissions of part or all of an offense." Id. at 763.
62 "Whether this statement constitutes a confession or an admission is insignificant .... In either event, it is the mandatory duty of the trial court to deter-
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v. Johnson"3 that when a defendant makes an incriminating statement while in police custody a hearing on the voluntariness of that
statement is mandatory. The only possible explanations for the
court's statement in Sanders are either that it did not actually
mean what it said or that it is creating an exception to the mandasole defense. Claritory requirement for cases where insanity is the
4
fication will have to await future decisions."1
C. In Court Identification
65 is the only case in the area of admissibility of
State v. Pratt'
evidence in which the court established new ground. The defendant was identified in court by witnesses who had also identified
him before trial from photographs shown them by the police. The
defendant requested that there be a hearing out of the presence of
the jury to determine whether the photographic display used by
the police was overly suggestive so as to taint the in court identification. He also asked to be allowed to examine the display book.
The trial court denied both requests.
The court, after stating that there was no authority on point
in West Virginia, adopted the view that a trial court must hold an
in camera hearing on the admissibility of an in court identification
when it is challenged as being tainted by a pretrial identification
made under constitutionally impermissible conditions."' Furthermore, the defendant must be allowed to examine the photographs
used in the pretrial identification." 7

Although the court did not discuss what would be constitutionally impermissible conditions, presumably it will apply the
same standards to a photographic identification as it has applied
to line-up and show-up identifications." '
mine, out of the jury's presence, the voluntariness of incriminating statements
made by the defendant, prior to admitting the same into evidence." 216 S.E.2d at
248 (emphasis added).
"1 "He was definitely in the custody of a police officer and was then subject

to the pressures of such arrest and custody. In these circumstances the failure of
the trial court to provide the defendant with a voluntariness hearing outside the
presence of the jury constitutes reversible error." 226 S.E.2d at 446.
I" For further discussion of State v. Sanders see Case Comment, 81 W. VA. L.
REv. 133 (1978).
1- 244 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1978).

Id. at 234.
16'
19Id. at 235.
10 See, e.g., State v. Slie, 213 S.E.2d 109 (W. .Va. 1975); State v. Moore, 212
S.E.2d 608 (W. Va. 1975); State v. Stollings, 212 S.E.2d 745 (W.Va. 1975). Also,
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D. Collateral Crimes

The issue in State v. Spicer6 ' was the admissibility of evi-

dence of other crimes. The defendant appealed his conviction for
armed robbery of three dollars on the ground that the evidence of
collateral criminal acts was so extensive and excessive that it prejudiced him and denied him a fair trial. At the trial the defendant's
victim testified in great detail about her abduction and rape which
were committed in conjunction with the armed robbery. Over the
defendant's objection the trial court allowed into evidence the testimony of two doctors who confirmed that the victim had engaged
in sexual intercourse within the time she alleged she had been
raped. The prosecuting attorney maintained that their testimony
was necessary to corroborate the victim's testimony. He also
dwelled on the rape in his opening and closing statements.
The defendant claimed that although some evidence of the
abduction and rape was admissible under the fourth exception
established in State v.Thomas,70 here the evidence of rape, which
was immaterial, irrelevant, and prejudicial, was so excessive that,
it denied him a fair trial. The state conceded that the defendant
was denied due process because the evidence of the rape was so
extensive that it amounted to trying him for a crime for which he
had not been charged. However, the court disagreed with the state
and said that the issue was not whether the defendant had been
tried for a crime not charged but "whether the defendant has been
denied a fair trial as a result of the evidence and prosecutorial
comments thereon."' 7 ' It stated that the doctor's testimony was
not necessary to corroborate the victim's testimony since it had
already been corroborated. Even if there were such a need, a less
prejudicial means should have been used. Furthermore, the testimony as to the details of the rape and the testimony of the doctors
was inadmissible because it did not serve to show any element of
presumably a court should apply the "totality of the circumstances" standard to
determine whether the in-court identification is tainted by the out-of-court identification.
189245 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1978).
170203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
The exceptions permitting evidence of collateral crimes and charges
to be admissible against an accused are recognized as follows: the evidence is admissible if it tends to establish. . .(4) a common scheme or
plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tends to establish the others. . ..
Id. at 455.
171State v. Spicer, 245 S.E.2d 922, 926 (W. Va. 1978).
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the crime being tried and was not necessary for the jury's understanding of how the crime was committed. The court held that the
indiscriminate admission of evidence of the rape combined with
the remarks of the prosecuting attorney was prejudicial and denied
the defendant a fair trial.'
In State v. Thomas the court had given two reasons why a trial
court might not permit otherwise admissible evidence of collateral
crimes: (1) the evidence of other crimes might prejudice the jury
so as to believe the defendant guilty of the crime charged; and (2)
it forces the defendant to defend himself against charges not
named in the indictment.Y3 The court in Spicer shows that it is the
problem of prejudice that is the real concern. The means of avoiding possible prejudice is to apply the balancing test set out in
Thomas: "(1) The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if
he finds that its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its
admission will . . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury ....
After Spicer, however, a court perhaps no longer has any discretion
regarding the exclusion of such evidence; it might now be required
to exclude all evidence except that which is absolutely necessary
and even that evidence must be tailored so that it will be presented
in the least prejudicial manner.
VII.

INEFFECTIvE AssIsTANcE OF COUNSEL

In the area of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendants
often allege that their attorney did not have time to adequately
prepare a defense. This allegation is usually presented in one of
two ways: counsel was appointed too late; or, although retained or
appointed well in advance of trial, counsel failed to expend the
necessary effort to prepare the defense.
It is a well established rule in West Virginia that the refusal
to allow defense counsel sufficient time to prepare for trial is a
denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel.7 5 On the other
hand, there had never been any guidelines as to what constituted
a sufficient time.17 1 In Housden v. Leverette, "I however, the court
87

Id. at 927.

"

203 S.E.2d at 456.

'74 Id.
'
State ex rel. West Virginia Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W. Va. 473, 63
S.E.2d 845 (1951).
7I Both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia had rejected any per se rule, even where counsel had less than a
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adopted the Fourth Circuit rule"' that there is a rebuttable presumption of ineffective counsel where there is an interval of one
day or less between the appointment of counsel and trial or the
entry of a guilty plea. This presumption is completely rebutted by
evidence showing competent representation. 9
Another claim of incompetent counsel often arises from the
defendant's constitutional right to appeal. In Turner v. Haynes,'
the attorney told his client that he would take the necessary steps
to perfect an appeal. After reviewing the record, however, the attorney concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Consequently
he wrote the defendant that if the defendant still wanted to appeal,
he would request the court to appoint a new attorney for that
purpose. 8' The attorney never filed an appeal.
The court held that counsel's failure to file an appeal, even
though counsel believed that such an appeal would not be meritorious, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court
stated that it was for the court alone to determine the merits of
an appeal. Since the attorney had usurped the responsibility of the
court, he had failed in his duty to the defendant. "The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only
be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in
82
behalf of his client.'
TUrner effectively changes the attorney's duty from simply
advising his client regarding the right and manner of appeal," to
forcing the attorney, whenever requested, to attempt an appeal.
Although the court does acknowledge the possibility of withdrawal
where counsel finds the appeal to be "wholly frivolous,"" even
then counsel must still support his client's appeal until the court
permits withdrawal. 5
day to prepare. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the defendant met
his attorney for the first time only minutes before trial, while in State v. Tapp, 153
W. Va. 759, 172 S.E.2d 583 (1970), the attorney was appointed the day of the trial.
1- 241 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1978).

Id. at 811 (cases cited therein).
Id. at 812. E.g., Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875, 879 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 908 (1973).
1- 245 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1978). See also Rhodes v. Leverette, 239 S.E.2d 136
(W. Va. 1977).
" The attorney never received any reply from the defendant and assumed the
defendant did not want to press an appeal.
"1245 S.E.2d at 630, quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
'
Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1969).
"' 245 S.E.2d at 631.
18 Id. The attorney must file a brief highlighting all possible issues which
'7

',
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The West Virginia court also considered whether a criminal
defendant was entitled to new counsel where he did not "get along"
with his court appointed attorney.' 8 In Watson v. Black,"7 the
court recognized the defendant's right to retain counsel of his own
choice, but rejected any contention that an indigent defendant has
a right to court appointed counsel of his own choosing. An indigent
could demand a different court appointed lawyer if the defendant
could demonstrate "good cause." ' Good cause, however, is not
satisfied by the mere failure to get along with defense counsel.' 8
"In order to establish good cause the defendant must show: (1)
conflict of interest; (2) a complete breakdown in communication
with his counsel after exhaustion of good faith efforts to work with
counsel; or (3) an irreconcilable conflict which might lead to an
unjust verdict."'8 0 The court failed to sufficiently describe just
what is necessary to satisfy any of these criteria, but the court held
that if any one of these three is suggested, the trial court should
hold a hearing on the matter and dispose of it on the record.''
In State v. Pratt,"I the court considered whether the inexperience of trial counsel can in itself constitute lack of effective counsel. In Pratt,the appointed attorney moved the court to appoint a
more experienced attorney and the trial court refused. Although
indicating that inexperience alone is not proof of ineffectiveness,
the court did warn that the trial court should see that "oppression
does not occur in criminal cases because of prosecutorial overmatch with defense counsel."'
VIII.

PRESUMPTIONS

Presumptions in the criminal law were once again considered
by the court in Jones v. Warden, West Virginia Penitentiary." In
Jones, the court entertained the question of whether the rule in
might support an appeal.
I" Watson v. Black, 239 S.E.2d 664 (W. Va. 1977).
"

Id.

,' Id. at 668.
"' The court was concerned that the indigent criminal defendant would instigate a dilemma intentionally, in hopes of creating a possible ground for a habeas
corpus petition.
10 239 S.E.2d at 668.
III Id.
12 244 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1978).
" Id. at 231.
"' 241 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1978). See also Kosut v. Leverette, 242 S.E.2d 247
(W. Va. 1978).
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State v. Pendry"5 should'be applied retroactively. Pendry had held
that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every material element of the crime and that the state could not
be aided in this task by a presumptive instruction.
In Jones the court held the Pendry rule to be fully retroactive,
allowing it to be used in a collateral attack against a final conviction."' "Safeguarding the integrity of the fact-finding process
.,197 was the purpose behind the court's decision. The court
expressed the view that when applying a new constitutional doctrine such as Pendry,which was designed to overcome interference
with the trial court's truth-finding function and which could possibly raise serious questions as to past guilty verdicts, the only
means of accomplishing the purpose of the doctrine would be to
give the doctrine complete retroactive effect.'
Although the retroactivity of Pendry holds interesting implications for the attorney, interest in the case also arises over the
possibility of the application of the harmless error rule in these
cases. Justice Neely in his concurring opinion stressed the need for
such an application, while Justice Miller opposed that view. Justice Neely looked to the possible effect of the retroactivity of
Pendry and lamented the potential wholesale release of criminals."' Justice Neely felt that by applying the harmless error rule
the potential impact on the administration of justice would be
lessened and the defendant's rights still protected.2" He would
apply the harmless error rule to dismiss a collateral challenge to a
prior conviction "[w]here it appears that the evidence is so overwhelmingly against the defendant; his defense is so utterly unrelated to any of the intricacies of the question of intent which is the
subject of the offending instruction; and, the defective instruction
"1 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976). The court specifically stated that the rule was
to be "applied to all criminal cases now in trial or appellate process and should not
otherwise be retroactive." Id. at 224.
"I The Pendry and Jones cases were both decided in response to cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court. Pendry incorporated into West Virginia law
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), regarding presumptive instructions. After
Pendry was decided, the United States Supreme Court then held in Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), that Mullaney was to be applied retroactively.
The court is merely adopting the effect of Hankersonin Jones.
"1 241 S.E.2d at 916.
" Id. See also Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972); Williams v.
United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
"1 241 S.E.2d at 918 (concurring opinion).
n Id.
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was harmless error in all other regards beyond a reasonable
doubt .... ,"I Justice Miller based his opposition to the application of the rule on the reasoning that the presumptive instruction
substantially impairs the truth-finding function and is thus always
so significant that it cannot be found harmless."'2
The interesting and perplexing factor for the attorney is that
each theory as to the application of the harmless error rule has two
supporters within its ranks.2 3 The West Virginia bar will have to
await further decisions to determine the full ramifications of
Pendry.
IX.

PLEA BARGAINING

In 1978, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided
three cases which dealt with plea bargains between criminal defendants and prosecuting attorneys. In State v. Wayne" the defendant, who had been convicted of first degree murder by a jury,
contended on appeal that the trial judge had erred by not accepting his proffered guilty plea to second degree murder pursuant to
a plea bargaining agreement with the prosecuting attorney. The
record in the case did not disclose the consummation of a plea
bargaining agreement. The court noted that the record did not
disclose a written bargain, that the terms of the alleged bargain
were not shown by the record, that the defendant had shown no
evidence of reliance, and that the defendant had not shown that
his position was irrevocably altered. No error was found in the trial
court's refusal to enforce what was apparently more of a discussion
of a plea than an actual agreement. In Wayne the court pointed
out that although there was no requirement that a plea bargain
agreement be in writing, there was a requirement that there be
substantial evidence that the bargain was, in fact, 05 a consummated agreement, and not merely a discussion.0 '
201
2

Id.
Id. at 919-20 (concurring opinion).

" Mr. Chief Justice Caplan joined in Justice Neely's concurring opinion, while
Justice Harshbarger joined Justice Miller, leaving Justice McGraw as the undeclared swing vote.
2
245 S.E.2d 838 (W. Va. 1978).
2
Id. at 840 n. 1, wherein the court stated that the fact that the defendant
has performed his part of an alleged plea bargain to his substantial detriment was
alone compelling but not conclusive evidence that an agreement did, in fact, exist.
As pointed out in the opinion, it is advisable to have court approval, whether
formal or informal, to a plea bargain. See W. VA. CODE § 62-2-25 (1977 Replacement
Vol.).
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In Brooks v. Narick,17 the court considered another facet of
the problem. In Brooks the defendant, after being indicted for
delivery of marijuana, entered into a plea bargain and agreed (1)
to plead guilty, (2) to go to a correctional center for a sixty-day
evaluation and diagnostic study, (3) to begin his confinement on
July 12, 1976, and (4) to pay court costs of $656.90.01 The state's
agreement to drop all charges pending against him in the county
and to recommend probation was contingent upon a favorable
presentence report. If the report was unfavorable, the state was to
recommend that the court take whatever action it felt appropriate.
The defendant then pleaded guilty and was returned to court for
sentencing. Both the court and the prosecutor considered the report to be neither favorable nor unfavorable, so counsel's motion
for probation was denied when an assistant prosecuting attorney
affirmatively opposed it. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
plea on the grounds that the government had breached the agreement and the motion was granted. When seven new indictments
were returned against him, he moved the court to specifically enforce the plea bargain by dismissing the seven new indictments.
The trial court overruled both motions and denied the defendant's
motion to reconsider. The defendant petitioned for prohibition,
and the court held:
Where a defendant, having performed his part of a plea
bargain is coerced by the government's violation of the bargain
into withdrawing his guilty plea, he has the option of standing
trial on the not guilty plea and suffering whatever other consequences may result from his being in the original position, or
reinstating his guilty plea and requiring specific preformance by
the government of the bargain.
The court pointed out that Brooks could not be restored to his
former position by withdrawal of the guilty plea in that he had
already spent sixty days at Huttonsville Correctional Center.
In State ex rel. Gray v. McClure,21 the defendant, who had
been indicted for rape and sodomy, had reached an agreement with
an assistant prosecuting attorney whereby the defendant would
plead guilty to sodomy and be given credit for time served in the
county jail on these charges if the prosecution would enter a nolle
- 243 S.E.2d 841 (W. Va. 1978).

21Id. at 842.
210Id. Court syllabus point 2, cited in State ex rel. Gary v. McClure, 242
S.E.2d 704, 706-07 (W. Va. 1978).
210242 S.E.2d 704 (W. Va. 1978).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

39

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 7
[Vol. 81

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

prosequi to the rape charge. There was sufficient evidence to show
that an agreement had, in fact, been consummated and approved
by'the court. Subsequently, a new prosecuting attorney was
elected and the case was transferred to another judge. The new
prosecuting attorney refused to honor the plea agreement and the
new judge refrained from enforcing it. Gray sought a writ of mandamus compelling the new judge and prosecutor to honor the plea
bargain approved by their predecessors.
The court held that "a prosecuting attorney or his successor
is bound to the terms of a plea agreement once the defendant
enters aplea of guilty or otherwise acts to his substantial detriment
in reliance thereon."2 ' The court, however, pointed out that if the
defendant has not yet acted to his detriment, the state is not bound
to the terms of an inchoate plea agreement.
X.

HABITUAL CRIMINAL OFFENDER STATUTE

In 1978, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in
State v. McMannis't2 and State v. Pratt213 reasserted a number of
principles in clarifying the habitual criminal statutes.2 1, In Martin
v. Leverette,21' 5 another case involving a circuit court misinterpretation of the habitual criminal law, the court dealt with the issue
of credit for pre- and post-trial jail time.
In State v. McMannis, 2 1 the court stated that it had consistently overturned, for lack of jurisdiction, any additional sentence
imposed under the authority of the habitual criminal statute where
a defendant proved that the prior convictions were not for offenses
committed after each preceding conviction and sentence.217 After
M Id. at 707, citing Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) as
the governing rule (emphasis by the court).
212242 S.E.2d 571 (W. Va. 1978).
213244 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1978).
21 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-11-18, 19 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
215
244 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1918).
216242 S.E.2d 571 (W. Va. 1978).
212Id. at 574. The statute requires that when a person is convicted of an offense
punishable by penitentiary confinement and it is determined that he had once
previously been convicted of a crime punishable by such confinement, five years
must be added to the term of the sentence of imprisonment. If he were twice
previously so convicted, his sentence must be for a life term. W. VA. CODE § 61-1118 (1977 Replacement Vol.). After the prosecuting attorney files a written information alleging such prior convictions and identity of the prisoner, and upon the
silence or plea of the prisoner denying that he is the same person as alleged to have
been convicted of the prior offenses, a jury must be impanelled to find the truth of
the allegations. W. VA. CODE § 61-11-19 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
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declaring that none of those opinions had discussed the question
of whether the state or the defendant carried the burden of proof,
or what degree of proof would be required, the Supreme Court of
Appeals held that the state must carry the burden of proving the
jurisdiction of the court beyond a reasonable doubt.218 Where a
prisoner remains silent or denies being the same person previously
convicted, the circuit court has no jurisdiction to impose a greater
sentence under the habitual criminal statute unless the state
was committed subsequent
proves that each penitentiary offense
219
to each conviction and sentence.

Despite the court's assertion that none of the decisions upon
which it relied in McMannis had discussed the issue of burden of
proof,20 it appears that other prior cases had been dispositive of
the issue.21 Although the cases relied on in the case at bar were
decided after the 1943 amendment to the statute and the cases
cited in note 121 were pre-1943 decisions, the amendment merely
changed the relevant time of meeting the burden of proof. It appears that the language relating to proof was not changed and that
the amendment did not abrogate the prior holdings of the court on
the question of the burden of proof.m
In State v. Pratt,2 the court reminded the trial courts and
prosecutors that the habitual criminal statute is clear in its language requiring that enhanced sentences under its authority are
not to be imposed consecutively.Y The additional five-year term
for the second conviction is to be added to the primary term so
that, for example, a sentence of one to ten years becomes one
sentence for a term of one to fifteen yearsY2 Upon the third convic"

242 S.E.2d at 575.

at 575.
2 Id. at 574. The authorities cited were State ex rel. Yokum v. Adams, 145
2i9 Id.

W. Va. 450, 114 S.E.2d 892 (1960); State ex rel. Medley v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 409,
76 S.E.2d 146 (1953); Dye v. Skeen, 135 W. Va. 90, 62 S.E.2d 681 (1950). The

burden of proof was not in issue in these cases and as the court declared in
McMannis, it was not discussed.
221 State v. Lawson, 125 W. Va. 1, 22 S.E.2d 643 (1942); State v. Stout, 116
W. Va. 398, 180 S.E. 443 (1935). In State v.Lawson, the court stated, citing Stout,
that "[a] charge of former conviction . . . is submitted to the . . .jury. The
charge ... must be proved with the same degree of certainty as the charge of the

substantive offense.

. . ."

125 W. Va. at 3, 22 S.E.2d at 644.

v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 409, 413, 76 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1953).
-2 244 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1978).
22Medley

221

Id. at 236.

Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39, 42 (W. Va. 1978); State ex ret. Holstein
v. Boles, 150 W.Va. 83, 86, 143 S.E.2d 821, 823-24 (1965); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18
225
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tion, and adjudication of the recidivist issue, it is the trial court's
mandatory duty to impose only one sentence of life imprisonment
in the penitentiary upon the prisoner.26
27
in addition to his
The petitioner in Martin v. Leverette,1
other allegations of error, argued that he was constitutionally entitled to credit against his ultimate sentence for time spent in jail
awaiting trial and after trial awaiting sentencing. The trial court
had refused to grant credit for either. The statute allowed the
judge to exercise discretion in granting credit for pretrial jail
time.

The claim was one of first impression in the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia. The court held that in light of recent
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and its own recent holding in Conner v.
Griffith,25 a prisoner has a right to credit for such time spent in
jail.?' While recognizing that the former cases were based on the
United States Constitution, the court preferred to hold that the
double jeopardy and equal protection clauses of the West Virginia
Constitution, article III, § § 10 and 17, are the sources of the right
in West Virginia. The court left open, as did the federal courts,
the question of the extent of the right where nonbailable offenses
are involved.n2
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
In J.B. v. A.B.2 the court reexamined the tender years presumption"I applied in child custody proceedings. The appellant
wife had filed for divorce, alleging cruelty. The husband answered
(1977 Replacement Vol.).
2H

244 S.E.2d at 236; W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977 Replacement Vol.).

- 244 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1978).

Id. at 41.
2n Id; W. VA. CODE § 61-11-24 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
21

- 238 S.E.2d 529 (W. Va. 1977).
21

244 S.E.2d at 41-42.
Id. at 42.

242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978). With this decision the court begins a procedure of styling domestic relations cases with "embarassing" facts by the initials of
the parties rather than by name. See n. 1 at 250.
2 "In a divorce proceeding where custody of a child of tender years is sought
by both the mother and the father, the court must determine in the first instance
whether the mother is a fit parent, and where the mother achieves the minimum,
objective standard of behavior which qualifies her a fit parent, the trial court must
award the child to the mother." Id at 250, court syllabus point 2.
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and counterclaimed for a divorce on the same grounds. The circuit
court granted a divorce to the husband and awarded him custody
of the child after finding that the mother was not a fit person to
have permanent custody of the child.2 5 The trial court's finding of
the mother's unfitness was based upon one incident of sexual misconduct which occurred during a period of separation between the
parties. The court held that the mother's misconduct was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute unfitness and that in the
absence of the mother's unfitness the trial court must apply the
presumption that it is maternal custody that best serves the interthe case with
ests of a child of tender years.26 The court remanded
7
directions to award custody to the mother.2

In considering the constitutionality and wisdom of the tender
years presumption, Justice Neely relied upon sociological, biological and evidentiary reasons to sustain the constitutionality and
soundness of the presumption. The presumption obviously involves a gender-based determination,m but in the absence of compelling evidence of a superior alternative, the court sustained the
presumption, relying on the socialization patterns of the traditional roles of mothers and fathers,ne the physical dependency of
an infant upon its mother,"' and the idea that the presumption
will achieve greater justice over a wider spectrum of cases than the
alternative of endless hearings about issues which cannot be satisfactorily resolved by the adversary system.2 4' Thus the essence of
the court's position is that the mother should always be awarded
custody of children of tender years 2 unless she is found to be
unfit.4 3
2 Id. at 250. The trial court apparently followed the rule that when marital
misconduct is the grounds for the divorce, the law generally favors the award of
custody to the innocent spouse. Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 136 W. Va. 708, 722, 68
S.E.2d 361, 369 (1951).
2" 242 S.E.2d at 251.
2 Id. at 256.
m Id. at 253. The court points out that the presumption is nondiscriminatory
in nature since the rule operates only where both parents are fit. Such reasoning
seems circular. Beginning from a point of "equality" of fitness does not mitigate
the later disparate treatment once the presumption is applied.
239
Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 254.
212 See 242 S.E.2d at 253 for a brief discussion of the meaning of "tender years."
242 Id. at 252. Where immoral conduct is the basis of unfitness, "the only
workable standard for the rebutting of the presumption is that the conduct must
be so outrageous that reasonable men cannot differ about its deleterious effect upon
the child." Id. at 256.
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By ignoring relative degrees of parental competence and mechanically applying a rule favoring a "fit" mother, the court may
be ignoring the best interests of the children involved in such situations. 2"4 Relying on tradition and expediency in place of a factfinding determination as to which parent is more competent and
thus capable of better serving the child's best interests seems to
be an inconsistent method of accomplishing the court's stated
objectives." 5
At issue in J.M.S. v. H.A.24 8 was whether a circuit court has
jurisdiction to award or deny visitation rights to a father of an
illegitimate child, a question of first impression in West Virginia.
J.M.S., the father of three illegitimate children by H.A., filed a
complaint seeking visitation privileges. H.A. answered, acknowledging that J.M.S. was the father of the children, but asserting
that visitation by the father would be detrimental to the best interests and welfare of the children. The circuit court denied relief and
dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked jurisdiction since
there had been no marriage alleged or proved and no right of visitation given the determined father by statute or common law. 47
The court reversed, unanimously holding that to deny a parent visitation rights without a hearing would constitute a denial of
due process and equal protection afforded by both the state and
federal constitutions.248 The court relied on statements by the
United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois241 that the father of an illegitimate child must receive the same treatment and
consideration as that received by any parent with respect to the
termination of his parental rights. The court also relied on its own
recent finding that the right of a parent to the custody of his or
her child, while not absolute, is founded in natural law and will
not be taken away unless the parent is found to be unfit.25 Recognizing that these cases dealt with custodial rights, the court reasoned that, because such rights conferred more authority over the
214This is particularly important since the welfare of the child is to be the
"polar star" guiding the court. See Green v. Campbell, 35 W.Va. 698, 702, 14 S.E.
212, 214 (1891); Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 216 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1975).
I' A growing number of jurisdictions now apply a test of competency rather
than a rigid presumption. It is not likely the court has put the issue to rest.
For further discussion of J.B. v. A.B. see 81 W. VA. L. Rav. 149 (1978).
246242 S.E.2d 696 (W. Va. 1978).
247

2U

Id.
Id. at 698; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV and W. VA. CONST. art. 11, § 10.

v1 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
21

Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1975).
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child than visitation rights, the courts should also have jurisdiction
to determine visitation privileges.11
EVIDENCE
I.

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

In Wilhelm v. Whyte,21 an original proceeding in habeas corpus, the petitioner unsuccessfully challenged his second degree
murder conviction, claiming that the prosecutor failed to disclose
certain exculpatory material and thus violated the trial court's
general discovery order.2 s At issue was a ballistics report containing possible exculpatory material involving the murder weapon.
The report was not furnished to defense counsel prior to trial; the
defense attorneys learned of the report's existence only when the
trooper who had conducted the ballistics tests began testifying at
the trial. The defense attorneys then moved for a mistrial. The
prosecutor maintained that he had learned of the report's existence
only the day prior to trial. The court took the motion under advisement, ordering that a copy of the report be furnished to the defense
counsel and that the ballistics witness remain subject to recall.24
The court found that late delivery of the exculpatory material
did not constitute a denial of due process.25 In doing so, the court
adopted the Fourth Circuit's position outlined in Hamric v.
Baileyns and later refined in United States v. Anderson.2l To determine when failure to furnish exculpatory material in a timely
manner will constitute a denial of due process, it will be necessary
to examine the circumstances of the case. If disclosure is made in
211242 S.E.2d at 697. Such jurisdiction is also implicitly given to circuit courts

by W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 6.
252

239 S.E.2d 735 (W. Va. 1977).

= Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
= Id. at 739.
21 386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967). In Hamric, the habeas corpus petition was
granted when it was discovered that the state had withheld exculpatory evidence
until after the jury retired. The court concluded that disclosing the evidence after
the jury retired was a violation of due process since such disclosure would be of little
value to the defendant. The court's holding was based on Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), and mandates that disclosure must be made before the taking of
the accused's evidence is complete. 386 F.2d at 393.
25 481 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973), affl'd, 417 U.S. 211 (1974). Anderson suggests
that, in order to avoid error, exculpatory evidence should be disclosed prior to trial
in a situation which is more complicated and where the exculpatory evidence would
have a material bearing on defense preparations. Id. at 690 n.2.
21
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time for the defense attorneys to "capitalize" on the evidence,
regardless of whether the evidence is made available prior to or
during the trial, then no violation of due process occurs. 25
The petitioner also contended that he was denied a fair trial
because the trial court overruled his motion for a continuance. "
The motion was based on two grounds: (1) late production of discovery materials and (2) the absence of a material witness. 20 Regarding the first ground, argument was made that the lateness
itself constituted a denial of a fair trial. The court rejected this
argument, stating that "late production alone will not suffice to
reach the constitutional level of denial of fair trial." 261 The court
also felt the second ground, relating to the absence of a witness
whose testimony was material on the issue of self-defense, was
insufficient when assessed from the standpoint of whether the lack
of the evidence resulted in a denial of a fair trial. 6 Thus the court
held that denial of the continuance was neither a violation of due
process nor of the state constitutional guarantee2 63 of a reasonable
time to prepare a defense. "
II.

INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICTS

The court clarified the meaning of State v. Pendry"5 in the
more recent case of State v. Starkey. 6 Pendry had held that the
"1 239 S.E.2d at 739. Since the report here was not unduly technical and did
not require a complex analysis, and since the trial court gave the defense attorneys
the time to examine the report and the opportunity to recall the witness, the court
felt there was no reason why the defense was unable to capitalize on the report. Id.
259Id.
2WId.
" Id. The court noted that a less rigid rule is applicable where the matter is
raised on direct appeal. See State v. Cowan, 156 W. Va. 827, 197 S.E.2d 641 (1973).

A different result might also be indicated if the state were in possession of physical
evidence crucial to the determination of the defendant's involvement in the crime
when the evidence must be subjected to scientific analysis to assist in determining
the defendant's guilt or innocence. See State v. McArdle, 156 W. Va. 409, 194
S.E.2d 174 (1973); State v. Harr, 156 W. Va. 492, 194 S.E.2d 652 (1973).
21

239 S.E.2d at 739.

W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
"1 239 S.E.2d at 740. A further holding of the court discussed in the section
"2

entitled CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE was that a spontaneous statement
made by a defendant prior to any action by a police officer and before an accusation, arrest or any custodial interrogation is made or undertaken may be admitted
into evidence without first holding an in camera hearing to determine its voluntariness. Id.
227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).
244 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1978).
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state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material
element of the crime and that the state could not be aided in this
task by a presumptive instruction. In Starkey one of the errors
assigned on appeal was that the state's instruction on the use of a
deadly weapon was erroneous."' The court held that the instruction was not violative of Pendry since the instruction was "not
couched in the mandatory language of a presumptive or conclusive
finding." ' Neither did the instruction contain language indicating
the defendant had any burden of proof to negate an essential element of the crime. ' Thus an instruction which allows the jury to
draw an inference after a finding that there was no "excuse, justification or provocation" will not violate Pendry.
The defendant also contended that the verdict was not supported by the evidence." ° The court took the opportunity to combine prior cases"1 and announce an integrated rule:
In a criminal case, a verdict of guilt will not be set aside
on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, where the
state's evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence
is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
To warrant interference with a verdict of guilt on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, the court must be convinced that the
inadequate and that consequent inevidence was manifestly
2
justice has been done."
After reviewing the facts surrounding the crime and applying the
new standard, the court found sufficient evidence to support the
verdict.23
"I The challenged instruction read: "The Court instructs the jury that malice
and intent can be inferred by the jury from the defendant's use of a deadly weapon,
under circumstances which you do not believe afforded the defendant excuse, justification or provocation for his conduct." Id. at 226, n.9 (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 226.
289 Id.
27oId.

at 220.

to this case, the court had used two standards of review. One standard
required that the evidence be "manifestly inadequate." See State v. Bias, 156 W.
Va. 569, 195 S.E.2d 626 (1973), court syllabus point 1. The other required
"7,Prior

"substantial evidence upon which a jury might justifiably find the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt." See State v. Johnson, 226 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1976),
court syllabus point 4.
22 244 S.E.2d at 221.
2 Id. at 224. The defendant raised two additional errors: (1) that the trial
court erred in refusing his self-defense instruction and (2) that the judge made
prejudicial remarks about him in front of the jury. Id. at 220. The court reaffirmed
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I. DuTy OF COURT REPORTERS
State v. Bolling"4 was an appeal taken from a conviction of
arson. The defendant assigned as error suppression of exculpatory
evidence by the state.25 Essentially, the defendant claimed he was
denied an opportunity to impeach a state's witness who was not
called to testify. The court noted that the "core of the doctrine of
suppression of evidence is that it must relate to some evidence that
would be relevant to an issue at the trial."' " Since the witness
never testified, her credibility was never at issue and introduction
of impeachment testimony could not have been proper.2
The defendant also asserted that the prosecuting attorney
made several prejudicial remarks to the jury in his closing argument and, as a result of the court reporter's failure to record the
closing arguments, prejudicial error occurred. 8 The West Virginia
Code controls what must be reported in a criminal trial. 9 The
court viewed these broad provisions as similar to the federal act2s
and concluded that a rule similar to the one evolved by the federal
earlier positions, ruling (1) that the duplication of instructions is unnecessary and
undesirable and therefore no error was committed since the court gave a proper selfdefense instruction which had been submitted by the state, and (2) that failure of
defense counsel to make known to the court his objection to the court's conduct
resulted in the point not being preserved for appeal. Id. 226-27.
-4 246 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1978).
21 Id. at 634. The court briefly discussed the state's duty to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defendant, citing Wilhelm v. Whyte, 239 S.E.2d 735 (W. Va.
1977). Id. See notes 252-58 supra, and accompanying text.
2' 246 S.E.2d at 635.

2n Id.
m Id.

W. VA. CODE § 51-7-1 (1966) provides in part:
The circuit courts of the several judicial circuitd in this State, or the
judges thereof in vacation, or the judges of any intermediate, criminal or
common pleas court, are hereby empowered and authorized to appoint
competent shorthand reporters to take and report, under such regulations
as such judges, or any of them, may prescribe, the proceedings had and
the testimony given in any case, either civil or criminal, or in any other
proceedings had in such court, including the taking of testimony before
the grand jury of such court for the use of the prosecuting attorney of the
county, and in proceedings before the judge of such court in vacation, and
otherwise to aid the judge in the performance of his official duties.
W. VA. CODE § 51-7-2 (1966) provides:
It shall be the duty of such reporter to take full shorthand notes of
the testimony and proceedings in which his services may be required, and
such notes shall be deemed and held to be official and the best authority
in any matter in dispute.
m'See 28 U.S.C. § 753 (1978).
M
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courts was therefore required. Thus the court held that all proceedings occurring in a criminal trial are required to be reported;2'
however, failure to report all of the proceedings may not in all
instances constitute reversible error. 12 While the court refused to
adopt a mechanical rule to determine when failure to report will
constitute reversible error, the court noted generally that the defendant must show some identifiable error or prejudice. Additional
consideration will be given to the nature of the claimed prejudice
or error. Thus the defendant will need to "demonstrate that some
error or prejudice has resulted and this is directly related to the
lack of a portion of the record." Bolling failed to do so and the
trial court's judgment was affirmed.2
IV.

PHOTOGRAPHS

At issue in State v. Dunn was whether the trial court erred
in refusing to admit into evidence a photograph of the defendant.
The defendant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance.
His defense was largely one of mistaken identity in which the
defendant claimed that his brother, and not he, had made the
delivery.26 He attempted to buttress this claim by introducing the
photograph on his Ohio driver's license, issued one week before the
alleged sale, showing the defendant with a well-developed beard.
The state's evidence indicated that the deliverer did not have a
beard at the time of the alleged delivery.
The defendant verified the photograph by identifying the license, its date of issue, and where and by whom the picture was
taken.27 The defendant testified that the picture on the license
21 246 S.E.2d at 637. For a more specific statement of what should be reported,
see 246 S.E.2d at 637 citing United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545, 550-51 (9th Cir.

1977).

246 S.E.2d at 637.
Id. at 638.
2" The defendant had also assigned insufficient evidence to support the verdict
as error. Id. at 632. The court found there was sufficient evidence and reiterated
22
2

the rule recently announced in State v. Starkey, 244 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1978). See
notes 270-73 supra and accompanying text. The defendant also claimed as error the
trial court's failure to give a requested instruction which would have told the jury
that a co-indictee called by the state did not waive his immunity against self-'
incrimination and therefore could not later be prosecuted. 246 S.E.2d at 633. The
court held that the tendered instruction was premised on an erroneous statement
of law and of fact; therefore failure to give the instruction was not error. Id. at 634.
- 246 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1978).
215Id.

at 249.

2" Id.
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accurately reflected his appearance on the date the picture was
taken and that he did not shave from the time of the photograph
until the time of the alleged delivery.21 After laying this foundation, defense counsel moved that the driver's license be entered
into evidence. The motion was refused."' The court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to admit
the picture under the "pictorial testimony" theory.15 The general
rule in West Virginia is that photographs, once verified and shown

by intrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the objects
they purport to portray, are "admissible in evidence as aids to the
jury in understanding the evidence." 2' The ruling on admissibility
is, of course, discretionary. The court reasoned that the defendant
had verified the photograph, that his appearance was critical to
the claim of mistaken identity, and that, after the proper foundation had been laid, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion
2 2
to disallow the use of the photograph to depict his appearance. 1
Since under the pictorial testimony theory a photograph is admissible only as an aid to understanding testimony already given
rather than admissible as probative evidence in itself, it was not
necessary that the photographer testify in order to establish admissibility.23
2U

Id.

Id. The circuit court also refused to let the jury see the picture, refused to
give the defense time to subpoena the photographer, and refused to allow the
defense to vouch the record with regard to the picture.
n' Id. at 251. The court briefly discussed'the two theories upon which photographs are entered into evidence. Under the "silent witness" theory the picture is
independent, substantive and probative evidence of what it shows. Under the
"pictorial testimony" theory, the photograph is admissible as the testimony of a
qualified witness who adopts or sponsors the picture as a substitute for the witness'
verbalization of what the picture portrays. West Virginia has not yet expressly
adopted the "silent witness" theory. Id. at 250.
" Id. at 251, citing Thrasher v. Amere Gas Utilities Co., 138 W. Va. 166, 75
S.E.2d 376 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 910 (1954).
2n Id. at 251.
"3 Id. The court further held that error was committed in refusing a defense
request to see notes used by the principal state witness, a police officer, when
testifying. The court noted that the issue was treated exhaustively in State v.
Dudick, 213 SE.2d 458 (W. Va. 1975), decided three months prior to this trial. Id.
at 252.
21'
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PROCEDURE
I.

IMPLEADER BY DEFENDANT

The issue on appeal in Haynes v. City of Nitro294 was whether
one codefendant could appeal an erroneous directed verdict in
favor of the other codefendant. The plaintiff in the case had sued
both codefendants as joint tortfeasors, and no question of joinder
was involved. The court held that the party prejudiced by the
error-the codefendant who suffered the judgment-was entitled
to appeal. The verdict was reversed and the case remanded. The
opinion of the court, however, couched this ruling in terms of the
right to contribution among joint tortfeasors, stating that the prejudiced codefendant in such a case is still entitled to seek contribution.21' The primary significance of the Haynes case is that it upset
the long established West Virginia rule that a defendant was not
permitted, on the basis of contribution, to implead a new party
whom the plaintiff had not chosen to sue as codefendant or joint
tortfeasor.
The prior West Virginia cases dealing with attempts to implead codefendants on the basis of contribution were consistent in
holding that such joinder was impermissible. In Rouse v. Eagle
Convex Glass Specialty Co.,2 96 the Supreme Court of Appeals

stated that the West Virginia statute providing for joinder of parties whenever full justice and a complete and final determination
of the controversy cannot be achieved without them could not be
construed to permit a defendant to have an alleged joint tortfeasor
made a party.
The practice is settled that the plaintiff in tort can sue one or

all who have jointly wronged him, and if less than all, can select
whom he will sue. The practice permitted [in the lower court]
would allow a defendant to select in part those to be sued;
would force the plaintiff into uncontemplated and perhaps undesired litigation with every added defendant .... 21

The Rouse decision was thereafter followed by the federal
courts in determining whether the defendant could implead a joint
-1 240 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1977).
213

Id. at 550.

-5 122 W. Va. 671, 13 S.E.2d 15 (1940). The plaintiff had sued the glass company for injuries sustained as a result of a falling window pane which the company
was replacing in a bank. The glass company moved to have the bank made a
defendant, which motion was granted over bank's objection. The Supreme Court
of Appeals reversed.
21 Id. at 672-73, 13 S.E.2d at 15-16.
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tortfeasor under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.298
In Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Saundersn9 the defendants argued that
impleader of a third-party defendant was proper in order that they
might have their right to contribution. Citing Rouse, and two West
Virginia statutes,11° the Fourth Circuit held that the law of West
Virginia was clear that the right of contribution could be asserted
against a joint tortfeasor only after a joint judgment, and that the
defendant could not compel the plaintiff to try his suit against a
party he did not wish to join.0
The most recent West Virginia ruling on the issue of impleader
of a joint tortfeasor came in Bluefield Sash & Door Co. v. Corte
ConstructionCo.m Justice Berry, speaking for the majority, stated
that Rule 14(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure",
allowed impleader by the defendant of a party who may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff s claim, but that the defendant
must first have a substantive right to relief. "Under West Virginia
law there is no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors in
the absence of a joint judgment.""3 '
The cases discussed above dealing with impleader of a third
party by the defendant made it clear that West Virginia law would
not permit such impleader on the basis of contribution. The recent
FE. R. Crv. P. 14.
- 159 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1947).

2

W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7-12, 13 (1966). Section 55-7-12 provides as follows:
A release to, or an accord and satisfaction with, one or more joint
trespassers, or tort-feasors, shall not inure to the benefit of another such
trespasser, or tort-feasor, and shall be no bar to an action or suit against
such other joint trespasser, or tort-feasor, for the same cause of action to
which the release or accord and satisfaction relates.
Section 55-7-13 provides as follows:
Where a judgment is rendered in an action ex delicto against several
persons jointly, and satisfaction of such judgment is made by any one or
more of such persons, the others shall be liable to contribution to the
same extent as if the judgment were upon an action ex contractu.
31 The Rouse and Saunders decisions were followed by the United States District Court in Franklin v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. W. Va. 1954), and
Wolfe v. Johnson, 21 F.R.D. 280 (N.D. W. Va. 1958). Both cases refused to allow
joinder by the defendant of an alleged joint tortfeasor whom the plaintiff had not
sued. Wolfe held squarely that "in cases applying West Virginia law, a defendant
cannot implead as a third-party defendant an alleged joint tortfeasor on the theory
of contribution." 21 F.R.D. at 282.
216 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1975).
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
3"216
S.E.2d at 218.
M
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case of Haynes v. City of Nitro,35 on the other hand, concerns
rights between two codefendants who have each been sued by the
plaintiff. The problem with the Haynes opinion is that it delves
into those cases dealing with attempts by defendants to implead
new parties as joint tortfeasors, an issue not present in the Haynes
case. The court seemed to believe it necessary to rule that West
Virginia Code § 55-7-13 does not foreclose contribution between
joint tortfeasors in the absence of a joint judgment, and thus expressly overruled Bluefield and Rouse on this point.3 8 It is difficult
to understand why the court even dealt with these cases in Haynes,
and even more difficult to understand why it felt they must be
overruled in order to reach the right decision. The court cited the
case of Crum v. Appalachian Power Co., 3 7 which allowed thirdparty joinder in federal court, contrary to the later rule in
Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Saunders. The court failed to note, however, that after Crum was decided a fundamental amendment was
made to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule
originally provided for impleader of anyone who was or may have
been liable to the defendant "or to the plaintiff." The quoted
phrase was struck in 1948, and for this reason the case was no
longer cited for its holding."'
It is important to note that the actual ruling in Haynes is
limited to cases where a plaintiff names two or more joint tortfeasors as defendants, and where a subsequent trial court error prevents the possibility of joint judgment. The court does not mention
impleader, and nowhere states that a new party may be joined as
joint tortfeasor by the defendant on the basis of contribution. The
actual result reached in Haynes is therefore a correct one, with a
basis both in precedent and policy. The imprecise reasoning of the
opinion, however, and its broad dicta on issues not presented have
confused the West Virginia law on impleader by a defendant.
Perhaps the most important issue confused by the Haynes
ruling is whether a defendant tortfeasor can implead an alleged
joint tortfeasor who has not been sued by the plaintiff or who has
already settled with the plaintiff. Although, as discussed above,
the facts of Haynes make its ruling inapplicable to this issue, its
broad dicta and purported overruling of prior cases not on point
lend themselves to an argument that such impleader should be

'

240 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 547, 550.

'

29 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. W. Va. 1939).
Wolfe v. Johnson, 21 F.R.D. 280, 281-82 (N.D. W. Va. 1958).
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allowed. Several issues, however, which -were not present nor discussed in Haynes, are important to a determination of whether a
defendant should be allowed to implead another on the basis of
contribution, especially when the other has settled with the plaintiff. For example, the policies of encouragement of settlements on
one hand, and prevention of unequal shouldering of the burden
among joint tortfeasors by reason of improper motives or collusion
on the other, must be considered. It is therefore inappropriate to
look to the Haynes decision as controlling on the issue of codefendant impleader.
II.

PLEADINGS-LmERAL CONSTRUCTION

After the adoption of the new West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, many hoped for a liberal construction of these procedural rules. At the same time, however, some also feared that the
procedural technicalities of the old rules would lead to a strict
construction. The West Virginia courts, however, have in case after
case dispelled any notions of strict construction. Two recent West
Virginia decisionsP1 demonstrate the liberal construction given to
these procedural requirements.
In John W. Lodge DistributingCo. v. Texaco, Inc.,310 the court
stated that pleadings should be liberally construed so as to do
substantial justice.3 1" In that case, the complaint alleged both unconscionability of a termination provision in the contract between
the parties and subsequent modification of the contract. The trial
court sustained a motion to dismiss on the grounds that there were
no factual circumstances stated in the complaint which could be
construed as stating a proper claim against the defendant.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, indicating that motions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor and should rarely be
granted.3 12 All that is required is sufficient information to outline
the elements of the claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that
these elements exist. 3 3 In addition, a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should not be
granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove
a" John W. Lodge Distributing Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 245 S.E.2d 157 (W.
Va. 1978); Johnson v. Huntington Moving and Storage, Inc., 239 S.E.2d 128 (W.
Va. 1977).
318245 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1978).
31 Id. at 158.
"I2Id. at 159.
313 Id.
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no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief."31 '
In Johnson v. Huntington Moving and Storage, Inc.,3"5 the
trial court granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
plaintiff's counsel had misnamed the defendant in the summons
and the complaint.316 The court reversed for two reasons. First, the
court held that a misnomer is cured by a judgment by virtue of a
curative statute and the harmless error rule.317 Second, the court
stated that objection to a misnomer could not be raised by a motion to dismiss, but must be raised either by answer or by affidavit
pursuant to the statute which provides that either party may
amend a pleading by inserting the correct name.318
These cases show the willingness of the courts to ignore the old
procedural technicalities so as to allow a decision to be based upon
the merits of the case and not on the talents of the pleader. Utilization of the liberal construction of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure in this manner will result, as is required by the Rules, 319
in greater justice for the parties.
PROPERTY
I.

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABrrABILITY

The law of landlord and tenant was the subject of the certified
questions posed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
Teller v. McCoy."' Basically, the court was asked: (1) whether a
warranty of habitability' is implied in residential leases; (2) if so,
whether this implied warranty of habitability and the tenant's
covenant to pay rent are mutually dependent; and (3) what remedies are available to the tenant in the event the implied warranty
31"

Id. at 159 (emphasis added). E.g., Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., 236

S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1977).
315239 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1977).
311The suit in Ohio was against Huntington Moving and Storage, d/b/a
Columbus Household Movers while the defendant's true company name was
Huntington Moving and Storage, Inc.

"1239 S.E.2d at 132. W. VA. CODE § 58-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1978); W. VA. R. Civ.
P. 61.
Id. at 131-32. W. VA. CODE § 56-4-29 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
No. CC900 (W. Va. Dec. 12, 1978.).
3' Such a warranty would require the landlord, at the commencement of a
tenancy, to deliver the dwelling unit and surrounding premises in a fit and habitable condition and thereafter maintain the leased property in such condition.
SIB

"
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is breached by the landlord.3 1 The Supreme Court of Appeals,
citing the inapplicability of the common law doctrine of caveat
emptor to present day landlord-tenant realities, responded to the
first two questions in the affirmative. The court then proceeded to
outline the remedies available under the new warranty.
The court's discussion of tenant remedies is the single most
important aspect of the Teller opinion. The actual adoption of the
implied warranty of habitability by the court assumes a lesser
degree of importance in view of the fact that the warranty was
legislatively adopted a few months earlier on March 11, 1978.1'
However, the statute did not address the important issue of what
remedies were available to the tenant. This absence of officially
recognized remedies served to undermine the actual value of the
statute to the residential tenant subjected to unsafe or unhealthy
living conditions. Though the tenant's rights were clear, the means
of enforcing those rights remained an enigma. Hence, the importance of the Teller case is apparent. By specifying the precise
routes available to the aggrieved tenant, the court clarified and
strengthened the meaning of the implied warranty of habitability
in West Virginia.
After recognizing that a residental lease is essentially a contract and that the tenant's duty to pay rent is dependent upon the
landlord's fulfillment of the implied warranty of habitability, 324 the
Supreme Court of Appeals outlined the specific remedies available
to the tenant in the event the implied warranty is breached. The
court held that a tenant may vacate the premises, thereby terminating his obligation to pay rent, or the tenant may continue to pay
rent and bring his own action or counterclaim to recover damages
caused by the breach. Additionally, the court held that a breach
of the implied warranty of habitability may constitute a defense
to an action for unlawful detainer or to an action for rent or damages brought by the landlord. The only remedy specifically rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeals was the one that would
allow a tenant, after notice to the landlord, to repair the defect and
deduct the cost of such repairs from his rent. In support of its
position the court noted that "the wide range of contract remedies
No. CC900, slip op. at 1.

W. VA.CODE § 37-6-30 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Since the cause of action in the
Teller case arose prior to the effective date of the statute, it was necessary for the
Supreme Court of Appeals to adopt the implied warranty of habitability in order
for the tenants in the case to benefit from its protection.
u No. CC900, slip op. at 23.
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available to the tenant are adequate to enforce fulfillment of the
implied warranty."3
The Supreme Court of Appeals then explained the measure of
damages applicable to a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The tenant's damages are to be measured by "the difference
between the fair market value of the premises if they had been as
warranted and the fair rental value of the premises as they were
during the occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe and unsanitary
3
' Additionally, the court held that damages for annoycondition.""
ance and inconvenience are recoverable by the tenant.
The Supreme Court of Appeals also addressed two incidental
issues not mentioned in the certified questions. First, the court
discussed the matter of escrow accounts. The court noted that the
trial court, during pendancy of an action for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability, may require the tenant to make future
rent payments or part thereof into an escrow account, but only in
limited situations, and then only upon the motion of the landlord
and after notice and opportunity for a hearing on such motion12
Finally, the court held that waiver of the implied warranty of
habitability is prohibited as being against public policy. In so holding, the court stated that "[i]f tenants seeking the scarce available shelter are compelled to waive their rights and accept uninimplied
habitable dwellings, then the protection afforded by the
'
warranty and the statutes could become meaningless."
By recognizing the implied warranty of habitability, specifying responsive tenant-oriented remedies, and holding that the warranty cannot be waived, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has taken the initiative to augment the pronouncements of
the state legislature and drastically improve the condition of the
3 9
often maligned residential tenant.1

If. EMINENT DoMAIN AND REsTIcTIvE COVENANTS
In Huntington Urban Renewal Authority v.CommercialAdjunct Co.,30 the court was faced with a novel factual situation
3n Id. at 26.

m Id. at 32.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 39.
For further discussion of Teller v. McCoy and the implied warranty of habitability, see Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin ResidentialLeases, 81
W. Va. L. Rev. 81 (1979).
= 242 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1978).
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arising out of an urban renewal authority's condemnation of a
parking lot in downtown Huntington. While the authority's plans
to condemn Commercial Adjunct's parking lot were pending, the
authority acquired other nearby properties, displacing businesses
and demolishing commercial buildings. Some of this real estate
was developed into competing parking lots and garages. As a result, Commercial Adjunct's parking lot revenue declined.", Since
the decline of a lot's revenue generating capacity affects its fair
market value, the question presented was whether the circuit court
should have instructed the jury to disregard any decline in value
for which the Urban Renewal Authority could be held solely and
2
directly responsible.m
It is settled that the measure of damages in condemnation
cases is the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking, that is, on "the date when compensation is paid or secured
to be paid." Commercial Adjunct argued persuasively that following this rule would lead to an unjust result in view of the especially detrimental impact of the authority's actions on the value
of the lot.
The court first examined a potential analogy in the "general
benefits rule" of Strouds Creek and Muddlety Ry. Co. v. Herold.'13
Under that rule the landowner is entitled to the entire value of
property taken even where that value has been augmented by the
prospect of a public improvement. The court recognized that logic
might dictate the application of a converse principle which would
have the landowner accept the detrimental effects of governmental
activity as well as the beneficial effects, but the court instead
distinguished the "general benefits" rationale by noting that
"[1aying waste to large downtown areas do not produce disadvantages of such a general character that the converse of the rule
on general benefits may fairly be applied."" 5 The court adopted a
new rule similar to that set forth by the Ohio court in City of
Cleveland v. Carcione. 6
The new rule, which the court expressly limited to governmental eminent domain activity of a nongeneral nature, waived the
33'Id.

at 563.

Id. at 563-64.
m Id. at 564; Buckhannon R. Co. v. Great Scott Coal, 75 W. Va. 423, 431, 86

3

S.E. 1031, 1034 (1914).

131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947).
242 S.E.2d at 565 (emphasis added).
3m

118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
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time-of-taking standard in applicable cases in favor of a rule allowing a more equitable evaluation of damages. The new rule entitles
the property owner to an evaluation of his property's value in light
of the peculiar facts and circumstances of his case when the condemnor activity, of a nongeneral character, has been responsible
for the decrease in value. The relevant time of taking is limited
only by the amount of depreciation specifically related to the project for which the land was taken. The circuit courts must allow
adducement of evidence about declines in value prior to taking
which resulted from urban renewal authority activity and the
property owner is entitled to an instruction that the jury disregard
the decline in making its compensation award.n7 In concluding,
the court stated, "[T]his case probably heralds our willingness to
conceptualize condemnation for urban renewal projects as a distinct and separate area of the otherwise well settled law of eminent
domain." 3
In West Virginia Departmentof Highways v. Sickles, 3 a case
involving the condemnation of private farmland for a highway construction right of way, the court liberalized its view of the meaning
of "comparable" sales offered in evidence to prove the value of
land taken. In this case the landowner, after testifying as to her
estimate of the land's value, sought to justify that valuation by
testimony concerning sales of other neighboring properties. The
circuit court excluded this evidence, presumably because it believed the other sales were not comparable2 41
The Supreme Court of Appeals reiterated that a landowner's
opinion of his land's value has long been recognized as admissible
evidence. Since estimating the value of land is a somewhat complex task, the methodology used to arrive at the value is indispensible to the jury's task of assigning proper weight to the opinion.
The court ruled that where the sales are comparable the witness
is permitted to recite them. 41
Evidence of voluntary sales in the same general vicinity may
be admitted to help the jury fix the value of the condemned land
unless there is a lack of sufficient similarity. Where the land is

'
3o
"

242 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 567.
242 S.E.2d 567 (W. Va. 1978).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570-71.
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dissimilar, the evidence is excluded by the court. 2 The standard
applied in determining whether the sales were sufficiently similar
was taken from State Road Commissionv. Ferguson,3 cited by the
court as authority for its holding in the present case. In Ferguson,
the court wrote that comparable sales are those involving properties "similar in size, character, time of sale and location." 4 While
retaining this basic rule, the court appears to have adjusted the
elements of the rule by holding that two of these elements, size and
proximity in time of sale to the taking, are matters of weight rather
than admissibilityYm5 Also, where the lands to be compared are
similar in character,us topography and value of improvements are
also matters of weight for the triers of fact. 7
Furthermore, the court ruled that the landowner may ask the
state's appraisal witness whether he has considered specific comparable sales and, if not, the appraiser may be required to consider
them and answer whether his appraisal would be altered because
of their inclusion in his analysis."'
In Morris v. Nease,4 9 a decision regarding restrictive covenants, the Supreme Court of Appeals expressed its willingness to
protect the unchanged portions of residential neighborhoods from
commercial encroachment from within or without the original
completely residential neighborhood. Dr. Nease's neighbors in
Huntington brought suit and were awarded an injunction closing
his chiropractic clinic which he had opened in a residential dwelling formerly used as a five-unit apartment house. 50 In reversing,
the court found that although the defendant had violated the restrictive covenant, the defendant's predecessor in title had also
violated the covenant, by building the apartment house on the
property. The court noted that the defendant's use of the property
was restrained and dignified, and was essentially similar to the
prior use. It therefore accepted the defendant's contention that the
342Id.; State Road Comm'n v. Ferguson, 148 W. Va. 742, 751, 137 S.E.2d 206,
212 (1964).
148 W. Va. 742, 137 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
ml Id. at 751, 137 S.E.2d at 211.
3 242 S.E.2d at 570.
348 See, e.g., State Road Comm'n v. Ferguson, 148 W. Va. 742, 751, 137 S.E.2d
206, 212 (1964); Virginian Power Co. v. Brotherton, 90 W. Va. 155, 159, 110 S.E.
546, 548 (1922).
31 242 S.E.2d at 570.
34

Id. at 571.

S"

238 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 846.
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plaintiffs' acquiescence in the prior violation was a defense to the
present action. The court quashed the injunctions leaving open the
1
possibility of a second suit should the situation change.3
It is important to note, however, that the court did not invalidate the restrictive covenant. After restating the accepted rule in
West Virginia that changes in a neighborhood's character can nullify restrictive covenants where they are so radical that they practically destroy the original plan, the court said that the original
covenants may grant protection to as little as one block of the area.
As long as existing violations within the neighborhood are not so
severe as to indicate a complete abandonment of the restrictions,
the remaining character and covenants of the neighborhood are
still viable. When changes have occurred, the court stated, "[i]t
does not follow

. . .

that the entire neighborhood is perforce re-

leased from the burden of restrictive covenants. On the contrary,
every effort must be exerted to protect the unchanged portions.
' 2
when businesses begin to encroach on the fringes. )3
TORT
I. RErALITORY DISCHARGE
In Harless v. FirstNational Bank, w a former bank employee
filed a complaint against the bank and its vice president. The first
count of the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was discharged in
retaliation for his efforts to require his employer to operate in
compliance with the state and federal consumer credit and protection laws. The second court claimed that the employer's conduct
surrounding the discharge amounted to intentional, malicious and
outrageous conduct which caused the plaintiff severe emotional
distress.
The defendants asserted that the plaintiff's employment was
for no fixed term and therefore terminable at the will of either
party, with or without cause. The trial court granted a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and
certified its ruling to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss and affirmatively answered
the certified question, that the complaint stated a valid cause of
action in both the first and second counts.
'

Id. at 848-49.

=S Id. at 847.

246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
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In Harless the court recognized that the defendants' asserted
defense was a well-established general rule."' However, the rule
was held not to be absolute. The right of an employer "to discharge
an at will employee must be tempered by the further principle that
where the employer's motivation for the discharge contravenes
some substantial public policy principle, then the employer may
be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by the discharge."" '
As to the plaintiffs second count which sought damages for
emotional injury as a result of the intentional, malicious and outrageous acts of the defendants, the court held that a cause of action
had been stated. The court found that the claim fell within the rule
that allowed recovery where there was no impact and no physical
injury caused by the defendants' wrong, but an emotional or mental disturbance is shown to have been the result of the defendants'
intentional or wanton wrongful act."6
II.

INTERSPOUSAL AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES

In Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer,57 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals persisted in its trend35 towards the abolition of
common law immunities as defenses to civil tort actions by holding
that "the defense of interspousal immunity is not available in suits
between spouses in this State."" 9 The plaintiff in Coffindaffer allegedly sustained personal injuries as she was operating her automobile on a public highway when it was struck by an automobile
driven by her husband. Immediately following the collision, the
defendant husband left his automobile and allegedly assaulted the
plaintiff causing her further injuries. Mrs. Coffindaffer brought an
Im Wright v. Standard Ultramarine and Color Co., 141 W. Va. 368, 90 S.E.2d
459 (1955); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d
271 (1975).

246 S.E.2d at 275.
Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475
(1945).
244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978).
In Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital, 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965)(chari31

table immunity of hospitals abolished); Freeland v. Freeland, 152 W. Va. 332, 162

S.E.2d 922 (1968)(family immunity limited to parent-child and husband-wife relationships); Higginbotham v. City of Charleston, 204 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1974) and
Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975)(rejecting common law
governmental immunity for municipal corporations); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721
(W. Va. 1976)(abrogating parental immunity so as to permit an unemancipated

minor to sue for injuries received in a motor vehicle accident).
=I 244 S.E.2d at 344.
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action against her husband on two theories. The first sought damages for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the husband's
negligent operation of his automobile. The second sought both
compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged intentional
assault. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the
defense of interspousal immunity barred the action. The Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
The court based its decision in part on what it perceived to
be a decided trend in other jurisdictions to abolish or restrict the
doctrine of interspousal immunity and in part on what the court
perceived to be the intent of West Virginia Code § 48-3-19 dealing
with married women's rights to sue."' Although the statute had
previously been interpreted as barring tort actions between
spouses, the court rested the new interpretation on the fact that
the conditions of society have changed."' The Coffindaffer court
also emphasized the significance of abolishing the immunity in
relation to intentional torts. Labeling the immunity a "cruel paradox,"3"2 the court stated:
Under the guise of promoting family harmony, it permitted
the wife beater to practice his twisted frustrations secure in the
knowledge that he was immune from civil liability except divorce, and that any criminal penalty would ordinarily be a modest fine. If nothing else, the knowledge of a monetary judgment
with punitive damages may stay such violence.31
The Coffindaffer decision is a progressive step towards abolition of those common law doctrines which are no longer supported
by the intricate social structure of modem society. In keeping with
this trend, Coffindaffer implies a ramification beyond the branch
of interspousal immunity. Since the court has now rejected the
family harmony and the insurance fraud theories as rationales for
interspousal immunities, it can be postulated that the court might
W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
This section provides:
A married woman may sue or be sued alone in any court of law or chancery in this State that may have jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
same in all cases as if she were a single woman, and her husband shall
not be joined with her in any case unless, for reasons other than the
marital relation, it is proper or necessary, because of his interest or liability, to make him a party. In no case need a married woman, because of
being such, prosecute or defend by guardian or next friend.
"1 244 S.E.2d at 342.
112
Id. at 343.
" Id. at 343-44.
*4
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apply this same reasoning to reevaluate the parent-child immunity
in West Virginia. In Lee v. Comer,38 ' the court partially abrogated
the immunity so as to allow actions between unemancipated minors and their parents for injuries suffered as a result of negligent
operation of a motor vehicle. It remains to be seen whether the
court, in the shadow of Coffindaffer, will extend Lee one step further and completely abolish the parent-child immunity in tort
actions.
Although there appears to be a trend in West Virginia towards
the abrogation of immunities as defenses to civil tort actions, this
trend is not without exception. In Boggs v. Board of Education,"
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that county
boards of education are immune from negligence suits, even
though county commissions are not.38
The Boggs case arose out of an accident in which an infant
child fell from a footbridge while traveling to school. The infant
and her father, as next friend, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Clay
County against the County Court of Clay County and the Board
of Education of Clay County, both of which governmental bodies,
it was alleged, maintained control of the footbridge. The circuit
court dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, on the basis of the
doctrine of governmental immunity asserted by the defendants.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the claim
against the county commission, holding that county commissions
are fundamentally independent of the state and thus not covered
by the immunity provided to the state by article 6, § 35 of the West
Virginia Constitution. 67
In considering the applicability of governmental immunity,
the court pointed out that the degree to which an agency is dependent upon the state coffers for its establishment, maintenance and
operation is an important, although not controlling, factor." The
- 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976).
- 244 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 1978).
3" W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35 which provides:

The State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court
of law or equity, except the State of West Virginia, including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein, or any officer, agent, or employer thereof, may be made defendant in any garnishment or attachment proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee.
3"

W. VA. CODE § 17-10-17 (1974 Replacement Vol.) (permitting suits against

county commissions) was consequently found not to violate the constitutional provision.
3

244 S.E.2d at 802.
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court found that the primary source of monies for the county
court's operation is the county's proportional share of property tax.
Recognizing that there was some funding from the state to the
county level, the court pointed out that most of such funding was
for the purpose of matching federal funds and did not establish
dependency to a large degree. Other factors recognized by the court
as indicative that county courts are not entitled to share in the
state's constitutionally imposed sovereign immunity included the
administration of funds at the county level, the fact that county
funds are not deposited in the state treasury and the fact that the
county owns its own property. Given this fundamental independence of the counties from the state, the court concluded that governmental immunity of the county is not of constitutional dimensions. Thus, the provision of the state code imposing liability upon
the county under certain circumstances was held constitutional. " ,
The court, applying the same type analysis, found that county
boards of education are performing functions on behalf of the state
itself, not merely on behalf of the various localities within the
state. The court found that not only does the state provide for a
comprehensive plan for state financial support of public schools, 70
but that the county boards of education rely on state monies to pay
their debts. Another factor which the court considered was the fact
that county boards of education are also subject to extensive state
control exerted by the West Virginia Board of Education and the
State Superintendent."' Therefore county boards of education are
considered to be sufficiently a part of the state so that, unlike
county commissions, they are entitled to share the protection of
the immunity of the state.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I.

32

DELIBERATE INTENT

313
In Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries,
three cases were consolidated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in constru-

ul Id. at 803.

w' See W. VA. CODE §§ 18-9A-1 to -20 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
: The court pointed out that the state controls such matters as the selection
of textbooks, teacher accreditation, personnel policies and other matters. See
W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 2; W. VA. CODE §§ 18-2-1 to -27 (1977 Replacement Vol.);
W. VA. CODE §§ 18-3-1 to -11 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
3 For a more detailed discussion, see Flannery, Beeson, Bradley, & Goddard,
Expanding Role of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Review of

Workmen's CompensationAppeals, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1978).
3 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
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ing the "deliberate intent" exception of the West Virginia Work3
men's Compensation ActY.
1 Under the section of the act being
construed, an employer loses immunity from common law suits if
injury or death results from "the deliberate intention [of the employer] to produce such injury or death. '375 The three cases involved injuries arising from an employer's alleged recklessness
with regard to safety. The trial courts ruled that recklessness was
insufficient to constitute deliberate intent, granting summary
judgment for the defendant in two of the cases, and a motion to
dismiss in the third. All three cases were reversed by the supreme
court allowing the claimants to proceed against their employers.
In its discussion of the substantive law, the court used language which may be viewed as substantially changing the application of the deliberate intent exception. The court stated that "[iun
light of the foregoing discussion, [a historical analysis of the exception and its relation to the purpose behind the act] the phrase
'deliberate intent to produce such injury or death' must be held to
mean that the employer loses immunity from common law actions
where such employer's conduct constitutes an intentional tort or
'
wilful, wanton, and reckless misconduct."376
The court's justification for including "wilful, wanton, and reckless misconduct" is its
belief that the ensuing harm "is no longer accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and must be taken as having been inflicted with deliberate intention for the purposes of the workmen's
'' 7
compensation act.
The court concluded that the act was enacted to remove
negligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort
system. A review of early case law convinced the court that those
decisions excluding nonnegligent acts from tort immunity had
been misread in subsequent decisions to appear to require a spe378
cific showing of deliberate intent.
Despite the expansive analysis undertaken by the court, it is
conceivable that the holding of Mandolidis is much more limited,
for it is important to note the procedural stance of the consolidated
cases. One of these cases was decided on a motion to dismiss, the
others on summary judgment. In light of the favorable inferences
permitted to be drawn in favor of the plaintiffs on such motions,
... W. VA. CODE
31

§ 23-4-2 (1978 Replacement Vol.).

Id.

311

246 S.E.2d at 914.

3"

Id.

37

Id. at 911-14.
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and the court's language to that effect, 39 it may be argued that the
case stands for nothing more than the proposition that allegations
of wanton and wilfull conduct do not as a matter of law preclude
the jury from finding the necessary deliberate intent."" Thus the
decision will undoubtably prove to be elusive and of little value.
Even if the decision is strictly interpreted as merely allowing the
inference of deliberate intent, rather than lowering the standard,
once a claim goes to trial, the "deep pocket" theory may almost
assure recovery for the claimant. The jury will be well aware of the
fact that if it is able to "infer" the necessary intent, the claimant
will be able to recover from his employer. If this theory holds true,
the effect will be the same as if wanton and wilful conduct alone
were sufficient to overcome immunity. It is also unlikely that many
employers will receive directed verdicts, as judges will most likely
defer to the supreme court's view that it is for the jury to determine
the presence of deliberate intent.
Under either interpretation of the decision, then, the court
totally rewrote the law of workmen's compensation concerning the
employer's immunity from suit. Although it makes a very strong
argument in support of its view by outlining the historical purpose
of the act, the court's decision did not fully address several contentions supporting the prior interpretation.
Every jurisdiction which has had its statute worded like West

Virginia's has required a specific finding of deliberate intent.3 1' It

is important to note that the penalty for such conduct is loss of
immunity from suit. 2 Other jurisdictions which incorporate the
language "wanton and willful" do not provide such a harsh result.
Instead, the amount recovered by the claimant is increased by a
specified percentage.3 m This approach seems more just when it is
recognized that it is not only the business which will suffer if it is
3" Id. at 917-21.
3"In Mandolidis the

court stated that "we do not believe that reasonable men
could not infer the necessary intent from the facts ...... Id. at 918. In Snodgrass,
the summary judgment was overturned because the court was unable to conclude
"that reasonable men could not draw varying inferences from the facts of the record
and ... infer that the injuries and death complained of resulted from a deliberate

intent. . . ." Id. at 919. In Dishmon the court was likewise unable to conclude that
"reasonable men could not infer therefrom the intent necessary to overcome defendant's immunity." Id. at 921. It is thus unclear whether the court intends by its
holding that "deliberate intent" must still be found but that it may be inferred, or

whether it intends that the standard is to be lowered.
ul See generally 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
38Z rd.
3a

§ 70 (desk ed. 1978).

Id.
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forced to fold because of crushing tort judgments; the employees
will also suffer. "34
The act has been amended in the past by the legislature, but
the particular section under consideration has remained unchanged. "The strongest evidence that it [the statute] has been
rightly explained in practice"3 is the fact that the former judicial
interpretation has been allowed to stand for years without change
by the legislature.3 81 The presumption is that the interpretation
has legislative approval. Despite amendments to various sections
of the act, the legislature has not changed the language in question.
The most troubling issue, however, was totally ignored by the
court in making its decision on the three cases. The court sought
to establish its interpretation based on legislative intent. However,
if the legislature had intended the standard to be wanton and
wilful conduct, it could have used those words. That such a standard was not intended is further supported by the fact that in the
very same section the legislature used those type of words to describe the type of employee conduct which would bar a claimant
from recovering under the act. It seems clear that the legislature
intended to establish two different standards since it used different
words." 7 The court's decision in Mandolidis eliminates that distinction.
The type of conduct condemned by the court may fairly be
characterized as reprehensible. An incentive may have been
needed to induce employers to guard against such occurrences.
How well the judicially created sanction will work remains to be
seen.
I.

ALLOCATION-MULTIPLE EMPLOYERS

Two cases were overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia in Maynard v. State Workmen's Compensation
I" Id. Along with providing urgently needed protection, compensation, and
economic aid to the employee, the act was intended to protect the employer from

expensive and unpredictable litigation. See Jones v. Laird Foundation, 195 S.E.2d
821 (W. Va. 1973)(Sprouse, J., concurring); Maynard v. Islaid Creek Coal Co., 116
W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934).

3" Mann v. Mercer County Court, 58 W. Va. 651, 660, 52 S.E. 776, 779 (1906)
citing SUMMAND

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 472.

u Id.
W. VA. CODE

§ 23-4-2 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
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8 In Maynard the court reinterpreted West VirCommissioner.3
ginia Code § 23-4-1, which provides a method of allocating among
employers the compensation paid to a claimant who develops occupational pneumoconiosis while employed by multiple employers. Maynard held that a claimant need not prove to what extent
each employer contributed to the 'disease. In doing so it expressly
and
overruled Turner v. State Compensation Commissioner'
3 90
Garges v. State Compensation Commissioner.

The latter two cases had held that an employee, upon filing
an initial claim for occupational pneumoconiosis when he had
worked for multiple employers, was required to prove to what extent or degree each employer had contributed to the disease. Because the allocation is to be made only among the employers by
whom the claimant was employed during the three years immedi"
' the inability to attribately preceding the date of last exposure,39
ute specific aggravation of the disease to the most recent employer
often meant that an employee could not recover at all. In Turner,
since the claimant had failed to show any perceptible aggravation
related to his last employment, the court held that he could not
recover from that employer. Since the claimant's previous employment terminated beyond the statutory period for filing a claim, he
was thus also barred from recovering from any previous employer.
The Garges case involved a similar situation and based its holding
on Turner.
In Maynard, the claimant worked for a mining operation
which had changed ownership. Medical evidence indicated that he
had developed occupational pneumoconiosis while working for his
first employer in 1959, although he was unaware of it until 1970.
Five months after United States Steel had assumed operation of
the Thacker mine, x-rays revealed a perceptible aggravation of the
condition. Medical testimony indicated that the aggravation probably could not have occurred in the five months claimant had
worked for United States Steel.
United States Steel argued, based on Turnerand Garges, that
since Maynard could not prove a perceptible aggravation of his
condition while in its employment, the company should not be
239 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977).
147 W. Va. 1, 123 S.E.2d 880 (1962), aff'd on rehearing,147 W. Va. 145, 126
S.E.2d 379 (1962).
3"

390147 W. Va. 11, 123 S.E.2d 886 (1962), aff'd on rehearing, 147 W. Va. 188,

126 S.E.2d 193 (1962).
"'

W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
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charged for any portion of his compensation. In overruling Turner
and Garges the court noted that, apart from an unpublished order
citing no precedent and to which two judges had dissented, "[tihe
principles and rationale of Turner [and, thus, of Garges] had
39 2
little or no support in the law prior to the Turner opinion itself.
The court outlined the requirements set forth in the code before a compensation award is to be disbursed. The relevant provision states:
[Tihe commissioner shall . . .disburse the workmen's compensation fund to the employees of such employers in whose
employment such employees have been exposed to the hazards
of occupational pneumoconiosis .. .and in this State have
contracted occupational pneumoconiosis ..
or have suffered
a perceptible aggravation ....33
,

The two criteria, as characterized by the Maynard court, include
employee exposure to dust during employment, and contraction or
aggravation of the disease within the state. 94 Apparently the court
interpreted the criteria as not requiring that the exposure caused
by the employer be proven to cause the contraction or aggravation.
It is merely enough that the employer expose workers to the hazard.
The allocation of a recovery among multiple employers is generally statutorily mandated. The language of the West Virginia
Code provision is susceptible to the court's interpretation. Other
jurisdictions, such as Virginia, which have held that proof of exposure is enough, have accepted as such "exposure" that which could
have resulted in the aggravation, although the claimant is not
required to prove that it did.399 Because evidence in Maynard
showed that the aggravation could not have been caused by the
claimant's exposure while working for United States Steel, it appears that even under the Virginia rule the claimant in Maynard
would not have recovered from United States Steel. However, the
39
Virginia statute specifies "injurious""
exposure and, therefore,
provides the basis for the differing results. Absent such qualification in West Virginia Code § 23-4-1, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia appears to be justified in holding that "there is
2"

239 S.E.2d at 508.
§ 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
239 S.E.2d at 506-07.

" W. VA. CoDE
"
"
"

Cooper v. Mary E. Coal Corp., 215 Va. 806, 214 S.E.2d 162 (1975).
VA. CODE § 65.1-50 (1973 Replacement Vol.).
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no requirement that an employee, upon filing an initial claim for
occupational pneumoconiosis where he has worked for multiple
employers, must prove to what extent each employer has contrib'
uted to his disease."397
The claimant will be required to prove
perceptible aggravation "only. . . if he seeks additional disability
compensation over and above that which he has received from a
previously adjudicated occupational pneumoconiosis award."399
The court also interpreted the statutory requirement that the
award should be allocated to the employers "based upon the time
'
and degree of exposure with each employer."399
It reversed the
Commissioner's method which was to calculate the percentage of
time the claimant had worked for each employer within the three
year period alone. Following the Michigan method,4 ® the court
concluded that the three year period determined who was liable,
but once liability was found, it should be apportioned based on the
total time worked for each employer.
Although the court's ruling may not square with notions of
fault-based liability, it is more in line with the purposes of workmen's compensation than the holdings in Turner and Garges.
Workmen's compensation is not a fault-based system: its major
purpose is to provide protection, compensation and economic aid
to the injured employee. 0' The employer trades off the system of
fault-based liability for advantages including immunity from common law actions. Given the trade off, and given the purposes of the
act, the continuation of a rule of law which would result in noncompensable disability as in Turner and Garges would not serve
the interests of the workmen's compensation system.
II.

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE-HEARING Loss

In keeping with the "beneficent purpose" and "liberal construction" doctrines of workmen's compensation laws, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals further expanded the scope of
compensation coverage in Myers v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. "' In Myers the court held that one suffering
from a noise-induced gradual hearing loss has a compensable claim
" 239 S.E.2d at 508.
3"

Id.

3" W. VA. COD § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
' Pentrich v. Dostal Foundries, 28 Mich. App. 263, 184 N.W.2d 316 (1971).
401 Jones v. Laird Foundation, 195 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1973)(Sprouse, J., concurring); Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934).
102239 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1977).
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under the workmen's compensation statutes. The injury sufffered,
diagnosed as "sensorineural,"40 3 was found to be an "occupational
disease" and, therefore, a compensable claim.10
It was undisputed that the noise level where the claimant had
worked over the years was sufficient to cause the hearing loss."' 5 By
applying the standard that the evidence is to be construed liberally
in favor of the claimant,0 6 the court concluded that the claimant's
injury had indeed been caused by the noise to which he had been
exposed while on the job. Although the claimant's injury was not
the result of a "single, isolated, fortuitous occurrence," 4 the court
concluded that "an employee who suffers a noise-induced gradual
hearing loss during the course of and resulting from his employment, sustains an occupational disease, by definition, a personal
injury under the provisions of W.Va. Code § 23-4-1."116
The court followed the same line of reasoning upon which it
based its holding in Lilly v. State Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner,"' wherein it held that a back injury gradually
brought about by a "constant and repeated lifting and twisting
motion" 10 was an "occupational disease" within the meaning of
the statute. In both cases, the injury fulfilled the statutory requirements: it occurred in the course of and as a result of employment;
there was a direct causal connection between the injury and the
claimant's working conditions; the injury could be seen as following as a natural incident of the work; and, it could be reasonably
traced to the employment as the proximate cause.4 '
"1 A sensorineural hearing loss is the type of hearing loss which occurs when
the hearing nerve, or any part of it, is damaged or degenerates. Id. at 125.
"' Id. at 127.
' The claimant had worked in an underground coal mine where, for three
years, he was exposed to the noise from dynamite explosions; for another eighteen
years he was exposed to the noises made by a pneumatic roof bolter and a continuous miner. Id. at 126.

4" Sowder v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 889, 189
S.E.2d 674 (1972).
"I See Jordan v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 156 W. Va. 159,
163, 191 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1972), wherein it was held that "[e]xcept in cases of
occupational disease, a claimant must prove an attributable work-related accident
before his disability will be held compensable" and that "[a] compensable accident. . . is an injury incurred by an employee 'attributable to a definite, isolated,
fortuitous occurrence.'" Id. (Citations omitted).
4- 239 S.E.2d 124, 127 (W. Va. 1977).
'
225 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1976).
"' Id.
at 216.
"'

Id. at 217-18, referring to W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978,Replacement Vol.);

Myers v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 239 S.E.2d 124, 127 (W. Va.
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By considering a gradual hearing loss to be a compensable
claim, West Virginia has joined several other jurisdictions which
have compensated this type of injury. 12 The case is in keeping with
the spirit of the workmen's compensation laws. As stated in Lilly,
"[t]o hold otherwise would operate to defeat certain valid claims
single, isolated, fortuimerely because there was no ascertainable
' 41 3
tous event which caused the injury.
IV.

CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF STATUTE

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Lester v.
State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,4 4 made what at
first appears to be a minor change in workmen's compensation law
with regard to the statute of limitations. In order to make the
change, however, the court was required to overrule what had been
a very basic legal concept regarding compensation law. "Therefore,
despite our course of decisions in this area of law, we are of the
opinion that the rights and duties under our workmen's compensation statute are no longer contractual but grow out of the employeremployee status to which the law attaches certain duties and re4
'
sponsibilities.""
The problem arose because a legislative enactment, which
changed the time period for filing claims, was passed after the
claimant's injury had accrued, but before the statute of limitations
in effect when the claimant learned he had occupational pneumoconiosis had run. Although the claimant had failed to file within
the time period of the previous statute, he had filed within the time
period provided by the amended statute. The question facing the
court was whether the new statute of limitations applied to the
claimant's situation.
The court applied the liberal construction given workmen's
compensation laws and held that the claim was timely filed under
the amended statute. Considering the beneficent purposes of workmen's compensation, the court reasoned that the amendment was
aimed at situations such as the claimant's where the injury or
disease was of the type that could remain undetected until after
1977), referring to W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
112New York, Wisconsin, Missouri, Georgia, Rhode Island, Louisiana,Arizona,
and California. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.40 (1976).
"I Lilly v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 225 S.E.2d 214, 218 (W.
Va. 1976).
"1 242 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978).
"' Id. at 450-51.
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the prior statute of limitations had run.4"' The court stated, citing
ample West Virginia cases as authority, that "where a new statute
deals with procedure only, prima facie, it applies to all actions-those which have accrued or are pending, and future actions."4 '7 Pointing out that a substantial majority of jurisdictions
hold that statutes enlarging the limitation period are merely procedural and, therefore, are applicable to claims accrued but not yet
barred, the court stated ' that "[w]e believe the majority view is
sound and we adopt it. 418
The court failed, however, to address the additional problems
with statutes of limitations for statutorily created rights and
causes of action. Such statutes of limitations are generally held to
be part of the right itself and, as such, part of the substantive law
governing the right. '9 The running of the statute not only bars the
remedy, but also extinguishes the right. 20 Therefore, the amended
statute of limitations was not a new statute dealing "with procedure only." The court addressed the issue by stating that the rule
incorporating the statute of limitations into the workmen's compensation act is "unnecessarily rigid and contrary to the humanitarian purposes of workmen's compensation legislation and is expressly disapproved."42 ' What the court appears to have overlooked
is that this "rigid rule" is not a rule of workmen's compensation
law, but a rule of law governing statutes of limitations. By disapproving the rule, has the court overruled it for every statutorily
created right or cause of action? Just as workmen's compensation
laws are "humanitarian" in purpose, so are other statutorily created rights, such as wrongful death actions. If "humanitarian purposes" is sufficient reason and authority for overruling a rule of
statute of limitations law with regard to workmen's compensation,
conceivably it will justify changes in other areas of law as well.
The court additionally considered the contention that applying the amended statute would impair contractual rights in violation of U.S. Constitution art. I, § 10, and West Virginia Constitution art. 3, § 4, the contract clause.2 2 To avoid the constitutional
"I Id. at 445.
,17
Id. at 446.
41 Id.
"I E.g., Richard v. Slate, 239 Or. 164, 396 P.2d 900 (1964); 51 AM. JUR. 2d
Limitation of Actions § 21 (1970); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1080 (1961).
41 E.g., Neff v. Garrard, 216 Va. 496, 219 S.E.2d 878 (1975); 51 AM. JUa. 2d,
Limitation of Actions § 15 (1970); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1080 (1961).
421

242 S.E.2d 443, 447 (W. Va. 1978).

42

The question of contractual impairment had to be addressed because a long
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attacks which were made when compensation laws were first enacted, legislatures drafted workmen's compensation statutes to
make them dependent upon mutual consent of employers and
employees."' Being thus "elective," the acts did not impair the
rights of employers and employees to enter into and agree upon the
conditions and terms of the employment contract."4
In Gooding v. Ott' the court considered whether the coverage
of the act extended to accidents occurring outside the state. The
court concluded that since coverage of the act was optional and the
parties "freely [entered] into the contract of employment with
reference to the statute, the statute should be read into the contract as an integral part thereof."42 6 That workmen's compensation
statutes are contractual in nature and considered a part of the
employment contract had, until Lester, been a basic concept of
compensation law in West Virginia. What the court points out in
Lester is that the courts were erroneously striving to find an
"elective" aspect to workmen's compensation in order to avoid
constitutional attacks. As early as 1917 the United States Supreme
Court held that workmen's compensation laws were a-valid exercise of the state's police powers."' The highest court in the land
"discarded the notion that workmen's compensation legislation
must be based ostensibly on contract."'8
Finding that past decisions unnecessarily reached for a
"fiction" that workmen's compensation coverage was elective in
order to read the laws as part of the employment contract, the
court in Lester abandoned the notion that workmen's compensation laws were contractual in nature. Therefore, retroactive 29 apline of decisions, beginning with Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862 (1916),

held that the workmen's compensation statutes were to be read into the contract
of employment between the employer and each employee. The apparent contention
of the employer is that if the amended statute is applied to the claimant, the
"agreement" under which he was employed has been legislatively modified.
" 242 S.E.2d at 448.
42
"

See 242 S.E.2d at 448-49.

77 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862 (1916).
S.E.2d 443, 449, quoting 77 W. Va. 487, 492, 87 S.E. 862, 864.
New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).

426 242

'"
' 242 S.E.2d at 449.

'2It is interesting to note that, almost as an afterthought, the court stated that
the amendment enlarging the time period for filing occupational pneumoconiosis

claims "is not retroactive legislation impairing vested rights." Id. at 452. The reason
it gave was that the amendment did not, in the present case, fit the definition of
"retroactive" as defined in the earlier case, Sizemore v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 219 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1975). If what the court asserts is correct,
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plication of the amended statute would impair no contract obligation.
The court also addressed the assertion that the employer had
a vested right, or a property right, in the limitation in effect at the
time of the injury. If so, the application of the amendment to the
claimant would unconstitutionally impair the employer's right.
The court dismissed the contention by stating that a person has
no vested right in the running of a statute of limitations "unless it
has completely run and barred the action." 30
West Virginia is now among the minority of jurisdictions
which regard workmen's compensation statutes as not being contractual in nature. 3 ' In addition, it appears to be in the minority
concerning retroactive application of amendments to limitation
periods. "[Sitatutory amendments changing limitation periods
are generally not applied retroactively, whether the effect of the
change would be to improve or worsen the claimant's position."'" 2
However, Larson himself commented upon the extremely strict
construction generally made of statutes of limitations in workmen's compensation laws: "It is odd indeed to find, in a supposedly beneficent piece of legislation, the survival of this fragment
of irrational cruelty surpassing the most technical forfeitures of

legal statutes of limitations.13 3 Although the effect in the Lester

decision was to mitigate a harsh result, it remains to be seen what
the repercussions are, if any, of the court's changes concerning
both statute of limitations law for statutorily created rights and
the contractual nature of workmen's compensation laws.
Rebecca A. Baitty
Kathryn Reed Bayless
W. Douglas Hamilton
James A. Jarrell
Glen L. Kettering

John C. Parr
James M. Robinson
James E. Showen
Karen L. Speidel
Richard Scott Stephenson
Richard Thompson

it seems that the court's conclusion would be dispositive of the case without all the
foregoing analysis.
"'

242 S.E.2d at 452.
See 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation, § 14 (1958) and cases cited therein.
3 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 78.80 (1976).

Id. § 78.40.
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